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This study presents findings from a close examination of five days of hearings before the 
Senate Judiciary Committee on the Nomination of Judge Brett M. Kavanaugh to the 
Supreme Court of the United States as a historical case study of federal information 
policy. I examined the shaping of federal information policy by the Senate Judiciary 
Committee itself, each Committee members’ views on Executive power and Executive 
privilege as well as current and former President’s impact on the process. I also examined 
the record of Judge Kavanaugh on United States v. Nixon and his legal and judicial 
approach to the Executive power and Executive privilege in order to facilitate an 
understanding of the Senate Judiciary Committee’s deliberations. 
 
Headings: 
 
Executive privilege (Government information) 
Information policy 
Nominations for office 
Checks and Balances 
Political questions and judicial power 
Transparency in government 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
THE RECORD(S) OF JUDGE BRETT M. KAVANAUGH: A CASE STUDY OF 
INFORMATION ACCESS, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE AND ACCESS TO 
EXECUTIVE BRANCH INFORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE 
JUDICIARY COMMITTEE 
 
 
by 
Bennett E. Chapman 
 
 
A Master's paper submitted to the faculty 
of the School of Information and Library 
Science of the University of North Carolina 
at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of Master of 
Science in Information Science. 
 
 
Chapel Hill, North Carolina 
August, 2019 
 
 
Approved by: 
________________________ 
Denise Anthony 
 
 
2 
 
 
Table of Contents 
 
 
 
Introduction.......................................................................................................................page 2 
Definition of Terms………………………………………………………………………page 7 
Literature Review..............................................................................................................page 13 
Methodology......................................................................................................................page 45 
Findings and Discussion....................................................................................................page 53 
Opportunities for Further Research ..................................................................................page 64 
Works Cited.......................................................................................................................page 66 
Appendices........................................................................................................................page 73  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Information science is “a discipline that deals with the processes of storing and 
transferring information.” [emphasis mine] Importantly, “It attempts to bring together 
concepts and methods from various disciplines such as library science, computer science 
and engineering, linguistics, psychology, and other technologies in order to develop 
techniques and devices to aid in the handling—that is, in the collection, organization, 
storage, retrieval, interpretation, and use—of information”.1 This definition paints a 
picture of a broad field that is interdisciplinary by its very nature. While information 
science is concerned and focused more on the practicalities of managing information and 
by extension the media it is stored on, information policy concerns itself with laws, rules, 
policies and practices that involve information. In 1999, former dean of the School of 
Library and Information Science and professor emerita Evelyn Daniel defined 
information policy as “The set of rules, formal and informal, that directly restrict, 
encourage, or otherwise shape flows of information”.2 A key aspect of information policy 
espoused in this definition is the control exerted to influence the flow of information. In 
the 2011 inaugural publication of The Journal of Information Policy, Sandra Braham 
details the history of the field in the late 20th century in her article “Defining Information 
 
1Lotha, Gloria. “Information Science.” ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, edited by The Editors of 
Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11 June 2015, https://www.britannica.com/science/information-science. 
2 Daniel, Evelyn. “WHAT IS INFORMATION POLICY?” The School of Information and Library Science 
at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2 Mar. 1999, 
https://ils.unc.edu/daniel/InfoPolicy/policy.html. 
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Policy”. In it she provides a more precise definition: “Information policy is comprised of 
laws, regulations, and doctrinal positions – and other decision making and practices with 
society-wide constitutive effects – involving information creation, processing, flows, 
access, and use.”3 
Judiciary committee hearings on Supreme Court nominations are crucibles in 
which the information policy of the federal government is expressed as a relation 
between the executive branch and legislative branch on the nature, role and aptitude of 
the nominee as one of the highest and most important members of the judicial branch. At 
the heart of the process is the idea that when the President of the United States as leader 
of the executive branch nominates someone to a position of public service, the 
Legislative branch of government, the Senate is expected to evaluate the nominee.  Those 
who are responsible for this candidate review and application are the members of the 
Senate Judiciary committee. This responsibility is the ‘advise and consent’ role of the 
Senate and the hearings themselves are sometimes referred to as the “last job interview”. 
‘Advise and consent’, the phrase frequently invoked during discussion of executive 
branch nominees, federal checks and balances, and separation of powers, comes from 
Article II, Section 2, Clause 2, of the constitution, which refers to the Senate's role in the 
signing and ratification of treaties. This term appears again in the constitution to describe 
the Senate's role in the appointment of public officials, right after detailing the president's 
duty to nominate officials. Article II, Section 2, paragraph 2 of the United States 
Constitution states: 
 
 
3 Braman, Sandra. “Defining Information Policy.” Journal of Information Policy, vol. 1, 2011, p. 1–5. 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5325/jinfopoli.1.2011.0001 
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[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the 
Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and 
he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall 
appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme 
Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not 
herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the 
Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they 
think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of 
Departments.4 
 
In the last few decades Supreme Court nominations have risen to be the highest 
profile, and frequently most controversial, nomination processes. These processes have 
become proxies for powerful interests. The exercise of power is a key vector of analysis 
in information policy research. However, the members of the Senate Judiciary Committee 
are not the only agents exercising power in this process. Current and former presidents 
can exercise power by restricting access to presidential records. 
When a prospective new member of the highest court of the land is nominated, a 
deluge of information is requested, accessed, created and used during the process of 
Senate review. Nominees have been questioned about not only their judicial rulings and 
judicial philosophy but also their past, their associations with organizations and 
individuals, and their actions. Broadly, almost anything can be relevant during this 
confirmation process because nomination to the Supreme Court is a lifetime appointment.  
 
4 U.S. Constitution. Article. II, Sec. 2. 1789. Accessed through https://constitutionus.com/ 
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An important question then is how does federal information policy inform the 
nomination, evaluation, and confirmation of prospective Supreme Court justices? The 
truth of the matter is that there is no consistent federal information policy. Instead policy 
is negotiated by empowered agents during these processes. Each nominee has a different 
record, and therefore each set of nomination hearings provides a different lens through 
which to view the information policy of the Senate Judiciary Committee. 
This masters paper provides a historical case study analysis of the Brett 
Kavanaugh nomination and the subsequent United States Senate Judiciary Committee 
nomination hearings as an example of the Executive-Legislative relations shaping of 
Federal information policy. The primary contributing factor to the richness of such a 
study is the unique résumé of Kavanaugh as a significant actor in both the Executive and 
Judicial branch who participated in events and decisions that directly grappled with issues 
of Executive Power, Executive privilege and specifically of interest executive branch 
information policy. Kavanaugh worked for a time as Associate Counsel for the Office of 
Independent Counsel under Kenneth Star and engaged directly with questions of access 
to the executive branch information of Bill Clinton under the Independent Counsel 
Statute. He also held positions in the George W. Bush administration as Associate 
Counsel for the executive branch, Assistant to President George W. Bush and staff 
secretary. His most recent experience was as a judge on the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 
A second unique aspect of the Kavanaugh hearings is the breadth and scope of 
documents and records that relate to his public service in these positions. This breadth 
and scope of potentially relevant records resulted in tension in the process of requesting, 
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accessing and making publicly available documents created or managed by Kavanaugh. 
Kavanaugh created, produced, and managed documents, records and information for the 
George W. Bush administration and tension in accessing these records resonates with 
actions taken by the George W. Bush administration and the “... most aggressive 
campaign in modern times to expand executive authority at the expense of the nation’s 
key open government and accountability laws.” 5 
Of the five areas Sandra Braham lists as being governed by the laws, regulations, 
and doctrinal positions of information policy - information creation, processing, flows, 
access, and use - information access is of great interest in this case study. The seemingly 
simple question, ‘What information about Brett Kavanaugh did members of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee and the public have access to?’ is far more complex than it appears 
on the surface. A more useful question for framing the access to information during the 
confirmation hearings in information policy terms would be to ask, “How did different 
individuals and organizations control the flow of information about and created by Brett 
Kavanaugh?”  
This information access aspect is but one facet of larger political conflicts that 
surrounded the Kavanaugh confirmation hearings; key to understanding access is 
understanding the actions taken by empowered agents. At the core of these questions lies 
a constitutional conundrum, i.e., the inherent tension of inter-branch access to 
information, or more specifically Congressional access to executive branch information 
that the executive branch seeks to withhold.
 
5 Montgomery, Bruce P. The Bush-Cheney Administration’s Assault on Open Government. Praeger 
Publishers, 2008. vii. 
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2. DEFINITION OF TERMS 
 I would like to begin by introducing some terms that important for this paper. 
Many of the key definitions for these terms are found in United States Code, title 44, 
chapters 21 and 22. These chapters are about the National Archives and Records 
Administration and Presidential Records respectively. When using somewhat ambiguous 
terms throughout my paper such as “administration”, I will attempt to clarify whether I’m 
referring to the National Archives and Records Administration (which I will abbreviate as 
NARA after its first use in each section) or some presidential administrations (such as the 
George W. Bush administration, or the Nixon administration). The Senate has its own 
jargon for conducting business, and after providing an excerpt from the hearing I will 
contextualize phrases with relevant rules from the Judiciary Committee as well as the 
Senate itself. 
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44 U.S. Code Chapter 21 National Archives and Records Administration 
§ 2101. Definitions 
As used in this chapter— 
(1)“Presidential archival depository” means an institution operated by the United 
States to house and preserve the papers and books of a President or former President of 
the United States, together with other historical materials belonging to a President or 
former President of the United States, or related to his papers or to the events of his 
official or personal life, and may include research facilities and museum facilities in 
accordance with this chapter; 
 
(2) “historical materials” including books, correspondence, documents, papers, 
pamphlets, works of art, models, pictures, photographs, plats, maps, films, motion 
pictures, sound recordings, and other objects or materials having historical or 
commemorative value; 
 
(3) “Archivist” means the Archivist of the United States appointed under section 
2103 of this title; and 
 
(4) “Administration” means the National Archives and Records Administration 
established under section 2102 of this title. 
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44 U.S. Code Chapter 22 Presidential Records § 2201. Definitions 
As used in this chapter— 
(1) The term “documentary material” means all books, correspondence, 
memoranda, documents, papers, pamphlets, works of art, models, pictures, photographs, 
plats, maps, films, and motion pictures, including, but not limited to, audio and visual 
records, or other electronic or mechanical recordations, whether in analog, digital, or any 
other form. 
 
(2) The term “Presidential records” means documentary materials, or any 
reasonably seg-regable portion thereof, created or received by the President, the 
President’s immediate staff, or a unit or individual of the Executive Office of the 
President whose function is to advise or assist the President, in the course of conducting 
activities which relate to or have an effect upon the carrying out of the constitutional, 
statutory, or other official or ceremonial duties of the President. Such term— 
(A) includes any documentary materials relating to the political activities 
of the President or members of the President’s staff, but only if such activities 
relate to or have a direct effect upon the carrying out of constitutional, statutory, 
or other official or ceremonial duties of the President; but 
(B) does not include any documentary materials that are (i) official records 
of an agency (as defined in section 552(e) of title 5, United States Code); (ii) 
personal records; (iii) stocks of publications and stationery; or (iv) extra copies of 
documents produced only for convenience of reference, when such copies are 
clearly so identified. 
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(3) The term “personal records” means all documentary materials, or any 
reasonably segregable portion thereof, of a purely private or nonpublic character which 
do not relate to or have an effect upon the carrying out of the constitutional, statutory, or 
other official or ceremonial duties of the President. Such term includes— 
(A) diaries, journals, or other personal notes serving as the functional 
equivalent of a diary or journal which are not prepared or utilized for, or 
circulated or communicated in the course of, transacting Government business; 
(B) materials relating to private political associations, and having no 
relation to or direct effect upon the carrying out of constitutional, statutory, or 
other official or ceremonial duties of the President; and 
(C) materials relating exclusively to the President’s own election to the 
office of the Presidency; and materials directly relating to the election of a 
particular individual or individuals to Federal, State, or local office, which have 
no relation to or direct effect upon the carrying out of constitutional, statutory, or 
other official or ceremonial duties of the President. 
 
(5) The term “former President”, when used with respect to Presidential records, 
means the former President during whose term or terms of office such Presidential 
records were created. 
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Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on the Nomination of Judge Brett M. 
Kavanaugh Transcript Day 1 September 4, 2018 
Members of Congressional committees can call for hearings to be adjourned for a 
variety of reasons. To put the motion to adjourn to a roll call vote simply means that the 
member wishes for other members to vote on their idea to end the hearing. The concept 
of executive session is something that has evolved over time in the Senate, and in 
particular during Supreme Court nominations. Prior to the 1920s Supreme Court 
nomination hearings were held behind closed doors in executive session. Suffice to say 
for now, the rules for the operation of hearings are slightly different when Senators have 
concerns about privacy. However, in this instance it should be noted that rule IV states, 
“The Chairman shall entertain a non-debatable motion to bring a matter before the 
Committee to a vote. If there is objection to bring the matter to a vote without further 
debate, a roll call vote of the Committee shall be taken, and debate shall be terminated if 
the motion to bring the matter to a vote without further debate passes with twelve votes in 
the affirmative, one of which must be cast by the minority.”6 This rule was quoted 
verbatim by Senator Blumenthal in an attempt to get the motion to adjourn brought to a 
vote. Chairman Charles Grassley did not call for a roll call vote of the Committee and 
justified this decision by stating that the rules of the Senate Judiciary Committee do not 
apply because they were not in executive session. Regular order is a reference to the rules 
of the Senate in which the business of the Senate is to be conducted in accordance with 
the rules of both the Senate, the Committee and if applicable, the subcommittee. In this 
 
6 U.S. Senate. “IV. BRINGING A MATTER TO A VOTE.” Rules of Procedure United States Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary, https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/about/rules. 
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case rule VIII. Order of Business states, “All motions made during the first two hours of a 
new legislative day to proceed to the consideration of any matter shall be determined 
without debate, except motions to proceed to the consideration of any motion, resolution, 
or proposal to change any of the Standing Rules of the Senate shall be debatable.”7 
 
 
SEN. BLUMENTHAL: MR. CHAIRMAN, I MOVED TO ADJOURN. I ASK FOR A ROLL 
CALL VOTE.  
SEN. GRASSLEY: WE ARE NOT IN EXECUTIVE SESSION. WE WILL CONTINUE AS 
PLANNED. 
…  
SEN. HIRONO: MR. CHAIRMAN, IT IS ALSO NOT REGULAR ORDER FOR THE 
MAJORITY 
TO REQUIRE THE MINORITY TO PRECLEAR OUR QUESTIONS THE DOCUMENTS 
AND VIDEOS WE WOULD LIKE TO USE AT THIS HEARING, THAT IS 
UNPRECEDENTED. THAT IS NOT REGULAR ORDER. SINCE WHEN DO WE HAVE TO 
SUBMIT THE QUESTIONS ON THE PROCESS THAT WE WISH TO FOLLOW ON THIS 
NOMINEE? I WOULD LIKE YOUR CLARIFICATION.  
SEN. GRASSLEY: SENATOR HIRONO, I ASK THAT YOU STOP SO WE CAN CONDUCT 
THIS HEARING THE WAY WE HAVE PLANNED IT. 
 
 
 
7 U.S. Senate. “VIII Order of Business.” United States Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, 
https://www.rules.senate.gov/rules-of-the-senate. 
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3. LITERATURE REVIEW: The Congressional Balance of Powers 
It would be a herculean task to attempt to summarize the entirety of interbranch 
interactions and disputes regarding access to executive branch information from the 
founding of the United States to present. Instead, I am providing in the following five 
sections to sketch an overview of the relevant constitutional issues, as well as their 
origins. 
In the first I have focused on outlining the scope, treatment, and Congressional 
approach of George Washington’s pre-Presidential and Presidential records in order to 
analyze the origins of the concepts of personal ownership of Presidential papers and 
executive privilege. In the second I have outlined the history of the Senate Judiciary 
committee and its changing role over time in nominating then evaluating judicial 
nominees. The third section summarizes the relevant changes to federal information 
policy that the Nixon Presidency and the Watergate scandal spurred by examining the 
Supreme Court case and Congressional legislation that arose from each, United States v 
Nixon and the Presidential records act. 
The fourth and final section provides a modern context for the case study by 
examining the ways in which post-Nixon Presidents undermined the Presidential Records 
act, rehabilitated executive privilege as well as some of those Presidents’ nominations to 
the Supreme Court
15 
 
 
I. George Washington, the Personal Ownership of Presidential Papers, 
and the Origins of Executive Privilege 
The first Congress met and began to pass laws in 1789, and the first 
recordkeeping statute passed by both houses and signed into law in that year was “an Act 
to provide for the safekeeping of the Acts, Records and Seal of the United States and for 
other purposes or the Records Act” .8 It entrusted the Secretary of State with preserving 
legislation and the creation, custody and use of the seal of the President of the United 
States. While the title of this act, specifically the inclusion of the word “records”, might 
seem to imply that the Secretary of State was also responsible for the disposition of the 
papers of the President while in office, this is not the case. The Secretary of State was 
only responsible for authenticating copies of official records by the seal. Throughout the 
early history of the United States, correspondence and records generated by the President 
themselves or their office were considered the personal property of the individual 
occupying the office. As with many other conventions, this practice became an American 
norm because of the actions of George Washington. The legacy that we are left with is 
one of scattered and incomplete collections of Presidential papers. There are several 
collections of George Washington’s papers held by the Library of Congress, the 
University of Virginia, and by the Mount Vernon Ladies' Association of the Union, a 
private, non-profit organization. The complicated provenance of his records foreshadows 
many later complications and constitutional questions about the disposition of 
presidential records.  
 
8 Hunt, Gaillard. “The History of the Department of State.” The American Journal of International Law, 
vol. 2, no. 3, 1908, pp. 591–606. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/2186332. 
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In 1776, prior to the British recapture of New York, then commander of the 
Continental Army George Washington wrote to president of the continental congress 
John Hancock, "I have thought it advisable to remove all the papers in my hands 
respecting the Affairs of the States, from this place… They are all contained in a large 
Box nailed up and committed to the care of lieutenant Colonel Reed . . . to be delivered to 
Congress, in whose custody I would beg leave to deposit them, until our Affairs shall be 
so circumstanced as to admit of their return."9 Washington was aware of both the 
sensitive nature of these records, and their importance. These papers accompanied 
Congress when it moved from Philadelphia to Baltimore. While these papers were in the 
custody of Congress Washington did have access to some records that he frequently 
referred to. However, this being a temporary agreement Washington reclaimed his papers 
in 1779. This arrangement set something of a precedent. Congress could (and perhaps 
should) be entrusted as a body responsible for the disposition of important records 
relating to the ‘affairs of the state’ rather than an executive. In fact, today the Library of 
Congress holds a collection of papers that “constitute the largest collection of original 
Washington papers in the world. They consist of approximately 65,000 items 
accumulated by Washington between 1745 and 1799, including correspondence, diaries, 
and financial and military records”.10 
Before the Revolutionary war ended, Washington also recognized that these 
papers, “which may be of equal public utility and private satisfaction" remained in loose 
 
9 Dorothy S. Eaton, U.S. GPO. Essay for Finding Aid for the “George Washington papers, 1592-1943”, 
citing Index to the George Washington Papers Library of Congress,1964. 
http://findingaids.loc.gov/db/search/xq/searchMfer02.xq?_id=loc.mss.eadmss.ms008068&_faSection=over
view&_faSubsection=custodhist&_dmdid=d16618e22 
10 Ibid. 
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sheets "in the rough manner in which they were first drawn," and that their unarranged 
state exposed them to damage and loss and made their use inconvenient.11 This neglect 
was rectified when the Continental Congress granted Washington permission to hire 
someone to “arrange and register” his records. Lt. Col. Richard Varick of New York was 
employed to complete these archival duties. He established 6 initial classes of documents, 
later adding a seventh for Washington’s private letters. In addition to creating a 
chronological arrangement, Varick spent a considerable time transcribing these journals 
and notebooks. There was an interest among several individuals to see and study these 
papers so that they might better understand the revolution. Washington rebuffed these 
requests, but in replying to one such interested party said, “"It appears to me 
impracticable for the best Historiographer living, to write a full & correct history of the 
present Revolution who has not free access to the Archives of Congress, those of 
Individual States, the Papers of the Commander in Chief, and Commanding Officers of 
separate departments. Mine—while the War continues—I consider as a species of Public 
property, sacred in my hands."”.12 Therefore, although Washington recognized the value 
and importance of these records and the publics’ interest and right to access these records 
he thought it best to retain them for himself. During his life only a select few individuals 
of Washington’s choosing would be able to see these sacred papers, most of whom were 
charged with transporting, transcribing or arranging them. These pre-presidential records 
were boxed up in trunks and left at Mt. Vernon when George Washington returned to 
New York to assume the office of President of the United States. 
 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid 
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The first Congressional Special Committee investigation, i.e., the first time 
congress investigated the executive branch took place after a failed military expedition. 
Following the Revolutionary War, the young United States continued to settle the 
Northwest territory (modern day Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan and Minnesota). 
Responding to an earlier retreat, Washington ordered the Governor of the Northwest 
territory and U.S. Army general Arthur St. Clair to mount a campaign against native 
tribes organized under the Western Confederacy. Due to low supplies, morale, few troops 
and a surprise attack St. Claire suffered a devastating defeat; it remains the single worst 
defeat suffered by the United States Army in its history.13 George Washington relieved 
St. Clair of his military command, but the House of Representatives was still motivated to 
investigate the Washington administration’s actions leading up to the defeat. Because this 
was the first time such an investigation would be undertaken there was uncertainty not 
only in how to proceed, but also whether Congress had the right to investigate at all. 
Ronald Shafer writing in the Washington Post wrote that Virginia Representative 
William Giles suggested that the House instruct President Washington to conduct the 
investigation, but that was quickly tabled due to objections from other members of 
Congress who argued that he did not have the authority.14 He continued with an account 
of the deliberations of Washington’s Cabinet saying they, “… quickly agreed that 
Congress had the right to conduct the investigation. According to Jefferson, Hamilton had 
reservations about giving Congress access to executive branch documents because 
 
13 Jenkins, Tamahome. “St. Clair’s Defeat and the Birth of Executive Privilege.” Babeled.com, 18 Nov. 
2009, https://web.archive.org/web/20101223113510/http://www.babeled.com/2009/11/18/st-clairs-defeat-
and-the-birth-of-executive-privilege/. Archived from the original on 23 December 2010. 
14 Shafer, Ronald G. “Target of the First Congressional Probe in U.S. History? George Washington, of 
Course.” The Washington Post, 19 Jan. 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/history/2019/01/19/target-
first-congressional-probe-us-history-george-washington-course/?noredirect&utm_term=.bb8726a36984, 
19 
 
 
lawmakers “might demand secrets of a very mischievous nature.” But the Cabinet, 
including Hamilton, nevertheless agreed that the president should give the committee all 
papers that “the public good would permit,” but “ought to refuse those the disclosure of 
which would harm the public”.15 This final point marks the ideological origins of the 
concept of executive privilege in the United States. 
George Washington was mindful that many of the actions that he would take as 
the first President of the United States would be considered foundational and formative 
for this new nation. After serving two terms in office he stepped down. Importantly for 
the following administration, “At the end of his term of office, Washington employed 
Tobias Lear and Bartholomew Dandridge, who had served as his secretaries, to separate 
from his papers those files which were intended for his successor in office, John Adams, 
and to pack and send the remainder to Mount Vernon.”16 The prospect of losing 
information about a particular department was minimal for two reasons: the federal 
government at this point was still quite small, and in this first transition Adams retained 
all cabinet members. Therefore, Lean and Dandridge arranged and registered most of 
George Washington’s papers, which returned with him in trunks to Mount Vernon. 
Washington had already denied access to his records relating to the Revolutionary 
war to several interested parties when they had inquired. But once he left office he 
recognized the importance of preparing these records: “Soon after he reached Mount 
Vernon, Washington wrote James McHenry that he planned to erect a building on the 
estate "for the accommodation & security of my Military Civil & private Papers which 
 
15 Ibid. 
16 Superintendent of Documents, U.S. GPO. “George Washington Papers.” Library of Congress, 1964. 
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are voluminous, and may be interest[ing]".17 This idea of an institution dedicated to 
preserving Washington’s records predated the establishment of the Presidential Libraries 
System as we know it by more than 150 years. Unfortunately, nothing came of it and his 
papers were bequeathed to an heir upon his death. The Fred W. Smith National Library 
for the Study of George Washington at Mount Vernon has some of these papers and 
provides dedicated resources for historians. The Library of Congress has the largest 
portion of these papers. Ultimately, preserving and providing access to executive branch 
information was not an area of chief focus for the founding fathers of the United States.18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17 Ibid. 
18 Relyea, Harold C. “Access to Government Information in the United States.” CRS Report for Congress, 
7 Jan. 2005, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/97-71.pdf. 
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II. Early Supreme Court Judicial Nominees and The Senate Judiciary 
Committee Origins and History 
The passage of the Judiciary Act of 1789 created the foundation of the United 
States Judiciary branch: “The law created 13 district courts in principal cities, with one 
judge apiece, and three circuit courts to cover the other areas of the eastern, middle and 
southern United States. Above these it set a Supreme Court, with a Chief Justice and five 
Associate Justices, as the only court of appeals”.19 Within two days, the first Supreme 
Court justices were nominated, confirmed and seated on the bench, though it was not 
long before another associate justice was added to ensure that an odd number of justices 
could effectively decide cases. These nominations during Washington’s first term in 
office were not controversial and took one or two days for the Senate to confirm except in 
the case of the successful recess appointment of Thomas Johnson of Maryland. This is 
because the constitution as it was written, signed, and agreed upon in 1789 gave the 
President the power to appoint, “judges of the Supreme Court” according to Article 2 
Section II clause 2.20 This Appointment Clause has been thoroughly studied and debated 
by constitutional scholars, and there is consensus that it was one of the checks and 
balances that the founding fathers devised to encourage a separation of powers. In this 
first term of the first administration there was little acrimony and controversy simply 
because there were very few cases for the Supreme Court to hear, and although there 
were differences of opinion among members of the federal government of the United 
 
19 The Supreme Court Historical Society “The Jay Court, 1789-1795.” The Supreme Court Historical 
Society, https://supremecourthistory.org/timeline_court_jay.html. 
20 Constitution of the United States, Article II, Section 2, clause 2. 1789. Accessed through 
https://constitutionus.com/ 
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States, there were not yet political parties. It would be a few years before the couching 
language of the Appointment Clause would really come into play. The key context of this 
language was where the Constitution stated that the President shall nominate, “by and 
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate… Judges of the supreme Court”.21 Therefore 
although nominees during Washington’s first term were seated without roll call votes, the 
Constitution still required that the Senate confirmed them. But this gentle treatment of 
nominees by the Senate was poised to change in Washington’s second term due to 
growing divisions in the country and his cabinet. 
In addition to the conflicts and controversies involving some of Washington’s 
second term nominees it is important to note the introduction of a body that was not 
mentioned in the Constitution but has perhaps had the greatest impact on the federal 
judiciary of the United States: the Senate Judiciary Committee. This committee was one 
of the first standing committees in the Senate and traces its origins back to the meeting of 
8 Senators during the first meeting of the Senate in 1789.22 This select committee was 
responsible for drafting the Judiciary Act of 1789, and in doing so, “established the 
present three-tiered hierarchy of the federal judiciary, and the Office of the Attorney 
General.”23 
Later with the expansion of the federal government the Senate voted in 1816 to 
establish standing committees so that Senators’ efforts could be concentrated in vital 
areas such as foreign relations, ways and means, and of course the judiciary. Reviewing 
the qualifications of Supreme Court nominees was but one of their responsibilities, and 
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unlike modern times their deliberations were held behind closed doors until nearly a 
century later when there would be public hearings on Supreme Court nominations. In one 
of the most comprehensive examinations of Supreme Court nominations, authors Barry J. 
McMillion and Dennis Steven Rutkus examined actions taken by each entity sharing 
power in the constitutional system of checks and balances: the Senate, the Judiciary 
Committee, and the President.24 In addition to analyzing long term trends such as the 
length of hearings in days and Senate Judiciary Committee reporting they also provide a 
useful table of Supreme Court nominations which I provide as the Appendix D.  
While the first few nominees to the judiciary were uncontroversial, the process 
was always conceptualized in the constitution as a relation of shared power between the 
Executive and Legislative branches. It is one aspect of checks and balances between the 
three branches of the federal government of the United States. As the country began to be 
divided for the first time into factions, first between the administration and the anti-
administration cabinet members of Washington then in a more organized way with the 
federalists and the anti-federalists, contention was introduced. The second chief justice of 
the Supreme Court, John Rutledge was the first ‘victim’ of this feud. Following the 
retirement of the first chief justice John Jay, George Washington gave Rutledge a recess 
appointment to be served until the next time that Congress met at which point the Senate 
would then vote on his appointment. Between the time he was given the recess 
appointment and the next time that Congress met he gave a speech that was highly 
critical of the Jay treaty. Federalists then used this speech as evidence of the mental 
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decline of Rutledge and used sympathetic Federalist newspapers to spread this narrative. 
Consequently, around the same time that the nation was first witnessing the two-party 
system emerge there was one of the first campaigns by one of those parties to discredit a 
judicial nominee. In a roll call vote of 10-14 the Senate rejected the appointment of 
Rutledge as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. 
Washington as well as his Vice President and successor John Adams did not have 
another unsuccessful nominee. However, there were those who declined the position, as 
the court was subject to relentless attacks by antifederalists.25 Adams had the vacancy for 
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and, as Gordon Wood relates, “In 1801 President 
John Adams had initially wanted to reappoint John Jay, the first chief justice in 1789. But 
Jay declined, explaining that the Court had none of the necessary “Energy, weight and 
Dignity” to support the national government and little likelihood of acquiring any.”26 
Therefore Adam’s second choice was John Marshall. It would be his last Supreme Court 
appointment, and as he later recalled, “... the proudest act of my life.”27 
Despite the anticipated peaceful first transition of power between political parties 
after 1800, the judiciary was a major point of anxiety because the sitting justices were 
thought of as sympathetic to the Federalists who appointed them. In those unprecedented 
times, rumors swirled about Justices being removed so it was notable that the Supreme 
Court decided to take up the case that William Marbury of Washington had raised against 
Secretary of State John Madison. Marbury was attempting to receive his commission as a 
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justice of the peace for the District of Columbia. This matter arose from the last minute 
“midnight judges” that Adams appointed as a part of the judicial reforms of the Judiciary 
Act of 1801.28 This Act sought to abolish circuit duties for Supreme Court judges and set 
up new circuit courts with 16 new judges, but it was quickly repealed by the new 
Congress and replaced with the Judiciary Act of 1802. However, in the case of Marbury v 
Madison the Supreme Court ruled that it had the right of federal judicial review, which 
alarmed Jefferson and his supporters. Due to these circumstances, the Jeffersonians felt 
that the time was right to bring charges of impeachment against Supreme Court Associate 
Justice Samuel Chase. Chase had been a signatory to the Declaration of Independence, 
but his opponents charged that his relentless trying of Republicans while serving on 
Circuit courts and open campaigning for Adams amounted to high crimes and 
misdemeanors.  
Ultimately the Senate did not pass the two-thirds threshold required to convict and 
acquitted Chase. Jefferson called the impeachment "a farce which will not be tried again," 
and he was right that articles of impeachment would never again be brought against a 
Supreme Court Justice.29 This impeachment attempt was an important moment for the 
United States though, because it helped to define the role of the judiciary and marked an 
end to attempts to define judicial independence. 
This impeachment episode was not examined in McMillion and Rutkus’ analysis, 
since it did not involve a nomination and preceded the creation of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee. On early nominations they state, “Initially, such nominations were handled 
without Senate committee involvement. Later, from 1816 to 1868, most nominations to 
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the Supreme Court were referred to the Judiciary Committee, but only by motion. Since 
1868, as the result of a change in its rules, the Senate has referred nearly all Court 
nominations to the Judiciary Committee”.30 This change over time still conformed to the 
constitutional principle that the entire Senate was responsible for advising and consenting 
on nominees, because although the Senate Judiciary Committee would investigate 
nominees they could only go so far as to make recommendations to the Senate. It was 
then up to a vote in the Senate which could go one of three ways. The nominee could be 
confirmed, rejected or the vote could be postponed. There were instances in which 
nominees were confirmed and then refused their seat on the Supreme Court; however, 
these refusals became less frequent when Circuit court duties that involved travelling 
great distances were done away with. It is also possible for the President to withdraw 
their nominee, which has been done 11 times. 
There is no mention of the Judiciary Committee in the Constitution. As the federal 
government expanded different standing committees were created to handle the business 
of the Senate and divide and focus the efforts of Senators. Through the weight of tradition 
these committees took on more responsibilities and more power. The committee 
chairmen were, and are, powerful individuals in the Senate, though they do not receive 
their mandate through the Constitution, but rather the peculiarities of Senate rules and 
procedure. It took some time for our young nation to agree upon and understand the 
nature and purpose of the Supreme Court, and understandings of the Appointments 
Clause have changed over time as well. Though there was disagreement about these 
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institutions and their functions, never did it rise to a constitutional crisis. Our nation 
would not witness that type of dysfunction until the election of Richard M. Nixon. 
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III. The Separation of Powers Before, During and After the Nixon 
Presidency: Watergate, United States v Nixon, the Presidential 
Records Act and Executive Privilege 
 
The actions and behavior of Richard Nixon as President of the United States, as 
well as the following Supreme Court case United States v. Nixon, fomented in the 
national consciousness a more open notion of information policy in the United States 
federal government. Put simply, the other two branches of government, the U.S. 
Congress and the Supreme Court, decided that the President should not have absolute 
control over information and records generated by the executive branch. For the Supreme 
Court, this was seen in the decision of United States v. Nixon; for Congress it was with 
the passage of the Ethics in Government Act and the Presidential Records Act. These two 
acts mandated the disclosure of certain information for public officials and “changed the 
legal ownership of the official records of the President from private to public, and 
established a new statutory structure under which Presidents, and subsequently NARA, 
must manage the records of their Administrations”.31 In the third edition of his book on 
Executive Privilege Mark Rozell characterizes  Nixon’s invocation of executive privilege 
during Watergate as abuse, and states that Nixon went further than previous Presidents in 
using executive privilege to withhold embarrassing and incriminating executive branch 
information. Summarizing the holding in United States v. Nixon and concluding with a 
holistic examination of Nixon’s pressure and influence on the Supreme Court is key to 
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understanding the legacy of his Presidency. I will discuss his Supreme Court nominees in 
the final section since they contextualize the modern nomination process more aptly than 
they contextualize Nixon’s actions during Watergate and the response from the other two 
branches of the United States federal government. 
 Watergate is the political scandal to which almost all subsequent scandals have 
been compared. Some have even been named after it by adding a -gate to the end of 
whatever is the key subject of the scandal. At the core of the scandal was the White 
House coverup and denial of association with the Watergate hotel burglary, the assertion 
of executive privilege over taped recordings and the “smoking gun” recording more 
specifically. For all the focus, attention, and memory dedicated to the scandal, coverup 
and exposing of Watergate there is less awareness of the fact that Nixon campaigned in 
1968 on conducting an open administration. He responded positively to a request by the 
chairman of the House Subcommittee on Government Information to reaffirm the official 
policy of allowing only the President to assert executive privilege, and not to allow 
subordinate employees in the executive branch to do so. He responded in the affirmative, 
and with an explanation of his administration position as well as a memo titled 
“Establishing a Procedure to Govern Compliance with Congressional Demands for 
Information” in which he explicitly stated, 
 
“The policy of this Administration is to comply to the fullest extent 
possible with Congressional requests for information. While the Executive 
branch has the responsibility of withholding certain information the 
disclosure of which would be incompatible with the public interest, this 
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administration will invoke this authority only in the most compelling 
circumstances and after a rigorous inquiry into the actual need for its 
exercise. For those reasons Executive privilege will not be used without 
specific Presidential approval”.32 
 
With our knowledge of the outcome of his Presidency, these actions and statement by 
Nixon seem to be foreshadowing later troubles. However, even throughout the Watergate 
scandal itself Nixon attempted to espouse a reasonable position on executive privilege. H. 
R. Haldeman and Alexander Butterfield testified before the Senate Watergate Committee 
because Nixon had waived executive privilege for staff aides on potential criminal 
conduct although Nixon certainly did not expect them to reveal the existence of recording 
equipment. Rozell relates that the Senate Watergate Committee and Archibald Cox, the 
Watergate Special Prosecutor, requested 9 tapes.33 At this point Nixon claimed executive 
privilege and declined to produce the tapes to either interested party. What came next was 
contemporaneously described by the Washington Post as, “the most traumatic 
government upheaval of the Watergate crisis”.34 It began when Nixon ordered Elliot 
Richardson to fire the Watergate Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox. Richardson had 
assured the U.S. Senate during his confirmation process that he would only remove Cox 
for cause, and he refused Nixon’s order and resigned in protest. Nixon then went to 
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Deputy Attorney General William Ruckelshaus and requested the same from him, but 
Ruckelshaus also refused and resigned. Moving down the line of succession of the Justice 
Department Nixon ordered Robert Bork the Solicitor General of the United States to fire 
Cox. Bork, unlike Richardson and Ruckelshaus, had not made any assurances to any 
Congressional committees that he would not interfere, and in a later interview he stated, 
“'I was thinking of resigning not out of moral considerations. I did not want to be 
perceived as a man who did the President's bidding to save my job.”35 Judging the role of 
Robert Bork in the entire series of events is a complicated matter. His complicity and his 
motives were debated contemporaneously as well as at his Supreme Court nomination 
hearings later. These resignations and firing would come to be known as the Saturday 
night massacre and the fallout and political pressure that was exerted on the White House 
and Justice department afterwards would result in a second Watergate Special Prosecutor, 
Leon Jaworski, being appointed. Jaworski requested more tapes than Cox, and once again 
Nixon invoked executive privilege to justify his refusal to turn over the tapes. The second 
refusal did not result in a firing, instead it led to a case that would be heard by the 
Supreme Court and ultimately it would lead to the resignation of a President. 
When Nixon refused to turn over tapes after the second request by the second Watergate 
Special Prosecutor, he put forth the argument that there can be no limitations on the president’s 
use of executive privilege because only the president himself has the authority to limit claims of 
executive privilege. In Nixon’s view Congress and the courts lacked the standing to challenge 
claims of executive privilege due to article II of the Constitution, which vested all executive 
powers with the President of the United States. In United States v. Nixon however, the court 
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held that executive privilege is not absolute. More specifically “The Court held that 
neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the generalized need for confidentiality 
of high-level communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified, 
presidential privilege.”36 Chief justice Warren Burger recognized that this case was a 
formative moment for the United States and sought to draft a unanimous position on the 
limits of executive privilege with the other justices. Although there were four justices that 
had been nominated to the Supreme Court by Nixon, including Chief Justice Burger, only 
Rehnquist recused himself due to close relationships with Watergate conspirators. These 
eight members of the court came together, and all signed on to the unanimous opinion 
that “granted that there was a limited executive privilege in areas of military or 
diplomatic affairs, but gave preference to "the fundamental demands of due process of 
law in the fair administration of justice." Therefore, the president must obey the subpoena 
and produce the tapes and documents.”37 Thus the court preserved this necessary 
constitutional power of the Presidency while holding that the President was not above the 
law. 
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IV. The Modern Context: The Rehabilitation of Executive Privilege, the 
Negation of the Presidential Records Act and Controversies and 
Campaigns of Supreme Court Nominees 
The concept of executive privilege was rehabilitated and restored during the four 
administrations of Ronald Regan, George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton and most significantly 
under George W. Bush. The implementation of the Presidential Records Act also changed 
through executive orders under Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush. In a somewhat 
ironic turn, United States v Nixon provided a foil for future Presidents’ arguments 
concerning executive privilege. While the presidencies of Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter 
can be characterized as ‘open’, subsequent Presidents have each sought to exert influence 
in different ways over executive branch information. In addition to providing a brief 
overview of the relevant episodes involving executive privilege and Presidents since 
Nixon, I would like to set the stage for an examination of the confirmation hearing of 
Brett Kavanaugh by examining several recent Supreme Court nominations and the 
George W. Bush White House. 
 
A. Presidential Administration Trends in Executive Privilege and the Presidential 
Records Act 
When Jimmy Carter was in the White House, he had his administration prepare 
for the passage of the Presidential Records Act of 1978. There was debate about the 
details of the act. Different members of Congress drafted several versions of the bill and 
there was a difference of opinion about how long after a President left office could 
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restrictions to public access be invoked. The Carter White House had been advocating for 
a 15-year limit, while the most popular of three bills proposed a 10-year limit. Ultimately, 
the adopted a compromise of 12 years into the final legislation. This would mean that 
using any or multiple of the six specific restrictions to public access could only be 
exercised for a limited time, at which point the public interest would win out. The Carter 
administration had extensive conversations about how to treat the disposition of records 
before and after the enactment of the PRA once Carter won reelection. The loss to Ronald 
Regan rendered these discussions moot, but they offer a glimpse of the optimism for the 
future embodied by the Carter administration. 
Ronald Regan was a different candidate and a different President. Carter and Ford 
did not change the official policy on executive privilege set out by Nixon in his 1969 
memorandum. While Regan offered a redrafting of the “Procedures Governing 
Responses to Congressional Requests for Information” to the heads of executive 
departments and agencies, Rozell argues that he did not fundamentally change the 
guidelines.38 While Regan did increase government secrecy in many ways, and sought to 
invoke executive privilege more than his two most recent predecessors, he did not have 
the public support or political capital in Congress to do so. Also, during the Regan 
administration the operational paradigm of the traditional separation of powers system 
provided Congress with tools to fight executive privilege claims. In four cases of 
executive privilege examined by Rozell, the Regan administration backed down from a 
more assertive stance after congressional pressure. The case that is of greatest interest to 
this study, the Rehnquist Memoranda that arose in 1986 during the Chief Justice 
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nomination of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court William H. Rehnquist, will be 
discussed at the end of this section is that of. 
The use of executive privilege in the presidency of George H. W. Bush contrasted 
with his predecessor. George H. W. Bush differed from Regan in terms of his style of 
leadership and did not seek to clearly define what his administration’s policy goals were. 
This was apparent from the sound bite in which he characterized the concept of an 
overarching purpose as “the vision thing”. A key indicator to Congress of this approach 
to executive privilege came when the chair and ranking minority member of a 
subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations wrote to Bush asking 
for the administration official policy on executive privilege. Despite sending an initial 
acknowledgement, the administration ultimately ignored the request.39 
In 1989, Bush’s Assistant Attorney General William Barr wrote a guiding 
department memo on Executive Privilege for the Office of Legal Counsel in which he 
described executive privilege procedures.40 He argued that an actual invocation of 
executive privilege was not necessary unless there was a subpoena, and importantly, 
“restated the dubious position first elaborated by Attorney General William French Smith 
that Congress’s interest in getting access to executive branch information for oversight is 
weaker than in the case of lawmaking.41 The result of the orientation of the George H. W. 
Bush administration is a normalization of secrecy; the Department of Justice that 
operated under this administration was efficient in hiding vast amounts of information 
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from Congress. Rozell claims that in a few episodes the administration “lost some 
information battles with Congress, but it won the information war by employing 
innovative and far-reaching secrecy devices”.42 
President Bill Clinton exercised executive privilege more aggressively than any 
other president since Nixon. It is apparent that the Clinton administration resorted to 
executive privilege in a manner akin to the Nixon administration covering up 
incriminating and politically embarrassing information from the public. We know this 
because of the reports written by Independent Counsel Kenneth Star and his staff, 
including Brett Kavanaugh, on several investigations of the Clinton administration. 
Starr’s conclusion in his final report in 1998 was that Clinton had, “repeatedly and 
unlawfully invoked executive privilege to conceal evidence of his personal misconduct 
from the grand jury”.43 Having served as governor of Arkansas, Bill Clinton was not 
reluctant to use executive privilege; he viewed it as a legitimate presidential power that 
had been damaged by Watergate. It is somewhat ironic then that he frequently went 
beyond the traditional bounds of protecting national security, the candor of advice to the 
President, and ongoing criminal investigations and only partially succeeded in restoring 
the standing of executive privilege. However, this revitalization of the concept of 
executive privilege during the Clinton administration was not part of a larger strategy by 
his administration to expand executive powers as would be seen in the administration of 
George W. Bush. Before I address the context of the Bush administration and Brett 
 
42 Ibid, 121. 
43 The Starr Report 244 (New York: Public Affairs, 1998). In Fisher, Louis. The Politics of Executive 
Privilege. Carolina Academic Press, 2004. 
37 
 
 
Kavanaugh’s role in it, I will first examine Supreme Court nominations leading up to the 
pivotal presidency of George W. Bush. 
 
B. Controversy and Campaigns for the Supreme Court 
There has been a gradual move away from voice vote confirmations of Supreme 
Court nominees, a lengthening of period between nomination and confirmation (or 
rejection), and the drastic increase in both the total hours of confirmation hearings and 
number of official questions for the record. All in all, it seems that the Senate is taking a 
longer time to consider Supreme Court nominees and using more of their tools to probe 
and comprehend the judicial philosophy of the nominee before them. This longer process 
in some ways has begun to look more like modern political campaigns. While the process 
for the most part has resulted in more information being disclosed to the Senate Judiciary 
Committee and the public, there has also been a trend since the nomination hearing of 
Associate Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg to not answer questions on matters that may come 
before the court. This is just one example of previous Supreme Court confirmation 
hearings serving as precedent for future hearings. 
Senate Historian Emeritus Don Ritchie lays out in an interview his idea about 
how specific Supreme Court nominations themselves change the Senate’s operations. He 
points to the fact that in the past nominations were considered in executive session, 
behind closed doors, by the entirety of the Senate. This was done so Senators could 
discuss the, “conditions, their standings and their personalities…”.44 He relates that 
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Supreme Court nominations were rarely rejected and that generally the President was 
thought to be allowed to select who he wanted for the Court. This changed in the final 
year of the Presidency of Lyndon Johnson when he nominated Abe Fortas to be Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court. Despite the fact that Fortas was initially confirmed as an 
associate justice with a voice vote, during his second nomination hearing Senators such 
as Strom Thurmond began to recognize that Richard Nixon might be elected and they felt 
that a Republican should be allowed to make that selection.45 This view is not without 
dissent, and at the time there were concerns raised about Fortas’ close relationship with 
the president and that “he had taken legal payments for speaking engagements that 
represented a conflict of interest and then had kept a legal retainer fee for a financier who 
faced investigations”.46 Regardless of the motivating reason, the Senate successfully 
blocked the nomination. Since Johnson had nominated Homer Thornberry to fill the 
associate justice position the filibuster by southern Democrats and subsequent failure of 
the Fortas nomination left Thornberry with no position to fill. Thus, when Nixon took 
office, he was able to nominate and seat Warren Burger as Chief Justice and shortly after 
received an opportunity to fill an associate justice seat on the court when Fortas finally 
stepped down.47 White House Counsel for President Nixon John Dean has made the 
explosive claim that, “[Nixon] created a vacancy by aggressively pursuing a sitting 
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Justice, Abe Fortas, whom he forced from the bench with a threat of a criminal 
investigation against his wife and a former law partner.”48 
 The two nominations that followed the appointment of Burger as Chief Justice 
however were a much different story. The nomination of Clement F. Haynsworth Jr. was 
the first nomination after Burger, and his nomination was strongly opposed by organized 
labor and civil rights groups. During the nomination of Thurgood Marshall, the Senate 
Judiciary Committee held public hearings for several days. This precedent allowed for, 
“hearings in 1969 also had extended questions and comments from the Senate Judiciary 
committee, which was unusual for the time. One issue that was debated was 
Haynsworth’s ownership of stock investments in three companies that were involved in 
appeals court decisions in which he took part.”49 Ultimately the Democratic majority 
rejected Haynsworth by a margin of 45-55, and media at the time compared the concerns 
raised about the financial holdings of Haynsworth to those raised about Fortas. Don 
Ritchie, however, argued that Haynsworth was in fact a qualified nominee and that the 
failure of the Fortas nomination had, “poisoned the waters” causing Haynsworth to be 
rejected.50 
In somewhat of a retaliation Nixon nominated a conservative southerner in 
George Harrold Carswell. He was not qualified, however, and although one Senator tried 
to spin this mediocrity as a positive claiming that, “There are a lot of mediocre people 
and they deserve representation on the Court” his nomination was rejected by the Senate 
 
48 Dean, John. “Nixon’s Uses, Abuses and Muses on the Supreme Court.” Verdict, 25 July 2015, 
https://verdict.justia.com/2014/07/25/nixons-uses-abuses-muses-supreme-court. 
49 National Constitution Center Staff “On This Day, The Senate Denies a Nixon Supreme Court Nominee.” 
50 Ritchie, Don. “Robert Bork and Supreme Court Nominations.” 
40 
 
 
as well.51 Chief Justice Warren Burger then advised Nixon to nominate Henry Blackmun. 
This nomination had a lasting impact on the nomination process due to preparations, i.e., 
Blackmun began meeting with Senators prior to his hearing in order to espouse his 
judicial philosophy and introduce himself. This novel strategy worked, and the Senate 
Judiciary Committee met for a single day in which they questioned him, and eventually 
confirmed Blackmun by a unanimous vote of 94-0.52 
Lewis Powell was also successfully nominated and confirmed by a nearly 
unanimous vote of 89-1. However, the next Nixon nomination faced some controversy. 
William H. Rehnquist had been involved in the administration as the head of the Office 
of Legal Counsel and was the last associate justice nominated by Richard Nixon. A 
contemporaneous story in the New York Times lamented this stating,  
“With only one dissenting vote, the Senate has confirmed the nomination 
of Lewis Powell to the Supreme Court. In this decisive manner, the Senate 
has shown how false was the imputation that it would not approve 
Southerner or a conservative. When a nominee is a man of professional 
stature, wide experience, and with a fundamental belief in the basic 
guarantees of the Constitution, no regional bias or philosophical 
disagreement bars his way. 
 
It is a source of profound regret that President Nixon's other nominee for 
the Court is not of the same quality. Instead, by submitting the name of 
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William Rehnquist, the President has once again provoked the turmoil of a 
confirmation struggle.”53 
This article foreshadows the several strategic moves attempted by the Senate to prevent 
the confirmation of Rehnquist. On December 10th, 1971 three events occurred. There was 
a cloture motion that was rejected 52-42, there was a motion to postpone until 1/18/1972 
that was rejected 22-70, and finally there was the confirmation vote that resulted in 68-
26. This struggle foreshadowed the later controversies that arose during Rehnquist’s 
Chief Justice nomination hearing. 
 Ronald Regan’s first Supreme Court nomination of Sandra Day O’Connor 
received a unanimous confirmation and had the highest recorded number of Senators 
voting for her confirmation of any nominee with 99-0.54 She was the first woman to serve 
on the Supreme Court. Regan’s second term nomination of Rehnquist to the position of 
Chief Justice however encountered more opposition.  
On July 31, 1986 Regan refused to give the Senate Judiciary Committee memos 
that William Rehnquist had written while serving as head of the Office of Legal Counsel 
during the Nixon administration even though Rehnquist himself did not object to memos 
being provided.55 A majority of the Senate Judiciary committee, eight Democrats and two 
Republicans, desired to see the documents and the dispute put into jeopardy not only the 
nomination of Rehnquist, but also that of Antonin Scalia, who was nominated to fill 
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Rehnquist’s seat. The Regan administration backed down and allowed Senators access to 
some documents. After that, each side claimed victory: the Democratic members of the 
committee rejoiced that they had been able to review the most important documents, and 
the Justice Department spokesman boasted that they had successfully limited the 
documents senators had access to.56 This episode was molehill compared to the mountain 
of controversy caused by the nomination of former Nixon Solicitor General Robert Bork. 
 Then Senator Joe Biden sought to prepare the committee for Bork’s nomination 
when he wrote to Attorney General Edward Meese for “certain material in the possession 
of the Justice Department and the Executive Office of the President”.57 This request 
covered a range of material including information created by Bork regarding the 
President’s pocket veto power, documents regarding his role during the Watergate 
investigation (particularly those that addressed his dismissal of Archibald Cox as Special 
Prosecutor and correspondence with Watergate conspirators) and key documents from 
Bork’s time as Solicitor General with regards to seven cases decided by the Supreme 
Court. For the most part the Justice Department complied with Biden’s request. Some 
documents were forwarded, others had to be unsealed by order of a federal district court 
judge, and a few were converted to redacted versions. The department emphasized that it 
had waived traditional considerations in order to comply with the request for information. 
The Senate Judiciary Committee then spent 12 days on public hearings grilling Bork on a 
variety of issues. The Senate Judiciary Committee then sent the nomination to the floor 
and reported it unfavorably, which had not been done since the nomination of John J. 
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Parker during the Hoover administration.58 Senate Historian Emeritus Don Ritchie points 
out a similarity and differences between Robert Bork and Antonin Scalia (who had been 
confirmed the year prior). Ritchie claims that with Democrats controlling the Senate there 
was more opportunity to examine this ‘equally conservative’ candidate. He elaborates 
that nominees have been advised that it is better not to engage with Senators in 
arguments, and that it was better to attempt to allow Senators to do most of the talking 
and politely answer their questions. However, Bork could not resist a good argument.59 
The second problem was Bork’s public stance on civil rights. He was opposed to the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and was on the record in several articles and public statements. 
This resulted in some southern Senators who otherwise would have supported a 
conservative candidate voting against his nomination. Ultimately Bork was rejected by a 
vote of 42-58. 
During the nomination of Elena Kagan, the records requested did not play a role 
in deliberations about her confirmation. There were sharp criticisms of her credentials 
and record by Republicans, and she served in both the Clinton and Obama 
administrations. However, the records from her time as Associate White House Counsel 
for Bill Clinton were cataloged and are available in the Clinton Library, President Barack 
Obama also waived executive privilege for records relating to her service as Solicitor 
General.60 Although she is a comparable candidate to Brett Kavanaugh in that she served 
in a previous administration of the same party by which she was nominated, and whose 
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party held a majority in the Senate during the time she was nominated, the comparison 
stops there. The policies of the Bush administration regarding executive branch 
information policy resulted an entirely different tenure for Brett Kavanaugh. 
C. The George Bush Administration and Kavanaugh’s Role 
 The George W. Bush administration attempted to expand executive authority in a 
systematic manner. Bruce P. Montgomery explains that this push was harkened when 
administration officials took office in 2000 and “declared their intent to reverse what they 
viewed as thirty years of legislative encroachment onto the constitutional prerogatives of 
the presidency”.61 For the context of the Brett Kavanaugh confirmation hearing this is the 
administration that has the greatest relevance. Not only does this administration have the 
greatest relevance to the recent treatment of the Presidential Records Act and executive 
privilege, it also is the administration in which Brett Kavanaugh served. 
 On November 1, 2001, President George W. Bush issued Executive Order 13,233. 
This order effectively nullified the Presidential Records Act by allowing presidents, vice 
presidents, and their heirs or representatives to invoke claims of privilege of access to 
their presidential materials in perpetuity.62 The most alarming aspect of the directive was 
the reversal of the ultimate disposition of records into the public domain. The order was 
essentially revoked by President Barack Obama’s Executive Order 13,489 which restored 
most of the wording of Ronald Regan’s Executive Order 12,667. The most notable 
change was that vice-presidential records were also covered by the executive order. As 
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with the Congressmen that drafted the Presidential Records Act however, there was an 
underestimation as to the lengths that George W. Bush and his representatives would go 
to shield their records from public scrutiny. Though we are approaching the 12-year mark 
from the end of the administration, there are serious concerns about records that were not 
preserved that were hosted on Republican National Committee servers. With the current 
Republican administration what is to stop an extension of the length of time that records 
from the George W. Bush administration are kept from the public domain? 
Kavanaugh joined Bush’s legal team in 2000 when they were attempting to stop 
the ballot recount in the state of Florida. From there he was hired as an associate by 
White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales. Brett Kavanaugh had clerked for Supreme Court 
Associate Justice Anthony Kennedy and utilized a unique perspective to help the 
administration get judges approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee. He also served as 
Assistant to the President and White House Staff Secretary. His 2003 nomination to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia was stalled in the Senate for 
nearly 3 years, and when he finally had public hearings he was accused by minority 
members of lying to the committee about his assistance in formulating the Bush 
administration’s detention and interrogation practices. He also denied having knowledge 
about emails that were stolen from minority members of the Senate Judiciary committee, 
though that did not factor into his consideration in 2006. Many of these issues reemerged 
after his nomination in 2018. 
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4. METHODOLOGY 
After spending time reviewing the literature on executive privilege and 
considering questions about presidential records and Congressional access to executive 
branch information I was captivated by the nomination, and subsequent confirmation 
hearings, of Judge Brett M. Kavanaugh. I realized that the hearings touched on much of 
what I had been considering and even focused some public attention on access to 
presidential records. When considering what type of research, I would conduct it became 
apparent early that this was going to be a case study; however, the precise definition of 
case study is not agreed upon by social science researchers. I examined multiple 
definitions. In “The Case Study Cookbook” Hayes, Kyer and Weber examine three 
definitions stating, 
 
“... case studies should focus “on gaining an in-depth understanding of a 
particular entity or event at a specific time” (Harvard). A guide on case 
studies from Colorado State University states that the focus should be on 
collecting and presenting detailed information (Becker et al., 2012). John 
Gerring takes another stance, believing that the purpose of such a study, at 
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least in part, is to use the collected data to generalize the results over a 
population”.63  
 
Each of these three definitions focuses on a different aspect of case study research. I will 
seek to gain an in depth understanding of the nomination of Brett M. Kavanaugh, and 
present detailed information about my findings. This case study research is particularly 
focused on a single, unique confirmation hearing, but there will be some attempt to 
present generalized findings in the opportunities for further research. The authors offer 
their definition: 
 
A case study is a form of observational study that focuses on the collection 
of data from a single case or multiple cases of a phenomenon. Case studies 
are used to gather data from one or more sites and can take place at a 
single point in time or over a period of time lasting up to several years. 
The goal of such a study is to increase understanding of the studied 
phenomenon, either 
in the context of a specific instance or generalized over a population.64 
 
In this definition there are two discrete options for the goal of studies. Generalization is 
not appropriate in most case studies in which maturity of the investigation is young, 
therefore, this case study will seek to increase understanding of federal information 
policy and the process of requesting and receiving access to federal and presidential 
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records. What are the means that Senators have, specifically minority Senators, to request 
and access documents that they need to do their duty? 
This specific instance of the Kavanaugh confirmation hearing was an 
unprecedented and unique case where several different actions were taken by several 
different agents, to prevent access to large document caches. Once again, however, the 
generalization that will be possible will come from examining previous instances in 
which nominees to the Supreme Court were employees in the executive branch. There 
may come a time in the future where a Supreme Court nominee has worked previously 
for a Presidential administration in some capacity. There may come a time where that 
nominee has created documentary material or records that are held by the National 
Archives and Records Administration. 
 
“The case is one among others. In any given study, we will concentrate on the 
one...” 
- Robert Stake (1995)65 
 
 I intend to frame and study this hearing as a case study among other Supreme 
Court nomination hearings by addressing the ways in which my research conforms to the 
definition and scope of a case study. Although Choemprayong and Wildemuth 
emphasizes that the standardization of the definition and scope of case study are debated, 
they provide the 11 key characteristics laid out by Benbasat et al. (1987).66 I would like to 
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go through each of the 11 and illustrate how studying the Kavanaugh confirmation 
hearing as a case study conforms and sometimes diverges from these characteristics. 
 
1. The phenomenon is examined in a natural setting. 
I am reexamining the hearings in the context of watching and listening to the official 
CSPAN recordings of them. I am also reading extensively about the Senate Judiciary 
Committee in order to better understand how it functions. 
 
2.  Data are collected by multiple means 
In addition to observing the hearings themselves I have searched the transcripts in order 
to more closely examine the mention and reference of important keywords. I have also 
closely studied many works on executive privilege in order to better understand 
arguments for and against its application as well as instances in which it was invoked and 
challenged. I relied heavily upon news articles to build a timeline of events in order to 
organize and separate different records requests and actions. 
 
3. One or a few entities (person, group, or organization) are examined. 
The primary organization examined is the Senate Judiciary Committee. 
The persons examined are Brett M. Kavanaugh, Senate Judiciary Committee chairman 
Charles Grassley, and Senate Judiciary Committee Ranking minority member Dianne 
Feinstein. 
 
4. The complexity of the unit is studied intensively. 
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The complexities of this Supreme Court nomination resulted from disagreements about 
the interpretation of the Constitution, the role of the courts and the system of checks and 
balances. 
 
5. Case studies are more suitable for the exploration, classification, and 
hypothesis development stages of the knowledge-building process; the 
investigator should have a receptive attitude towards exploration. 
I have attempted to explore and classify the different types of records requested and 
discussed as well as information about the Senate Judiciary Committee process. 
 
6. No experimental controls or manipulation are involved. 
There was no opportunity for me to manipulate or set experimental controls for this 
process. 
 
7. The investigator may not specify the set of independent and dependent 
variables in advance. 
Once again it would be impossible for me to specify independent and dependent variables 
in advance since I am examining this process retroactively. 
 
8. The results derived depend heavily on the integrative powers of the 
investigator. 
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My results have been derived from an integration of the transcripts of the hearings 
themselves, contemporaneous news articles published around the time of the nomination 
and hearings and correspondence between NARA and Judiciary Committee members. 
 
9. Changes in site selection and data collection methods could take place as 
the investigator develops new hypotheses. 
I have changed my data collection methods slightly over the course of my research but 
have largely remained consistent in attempting to explore what records were requested 
and not, what records were given to the Committee and what records were withheld. 
 
10. Case research is useful in the study of why and how questions because 
these deal with operational links to be traced over time, rather than with 
frequency or incidence. 
In addition to the what questions raised in the previous reply I have also sought to explain 
how these records were created, stored, and then transmitted (or not) to the Committee. 
Some of the why questions are obfuscated by political posturing on behalf of Senators on 
the committee. 
 
11. The focus is on contemporary events. 
The confirmation hearing of Brett Kavanaugh is the most recent supreme court 
nomination hearing that I could have selected. 
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Coding and Searching Transcripts for Information Policy Issues 
My initial goal was to closely examine the entirety of the nomination hearings in 
order to discern the information policy as it was expressed, discussed and questioned by 
Senators in real time. My first task before I could begin was to get a transcript of each 
day’s testimony so that I could really approach it. Unfortunately, the official transcript 
has not yet been published. In order to make my own I went to CSPAN.org and copied 
over the transcripts that were compiled using closed captioning. It was not perfect, but as 
I coded, I was able to listen to the hearings at the same time and determine both who was 
speaking and when errors occurred in the closed captioning. 
 The first area of interest for coding the hearing was discussion, questions and 
content related to information policy; the second was US Senate Judiciary Committee 
rules/procedures. The clearest instance of the former was when Senators brought up their 
access, or lack thereof, to documents and records that they deemed relevant. The access 
vector of information policy was the most clear and prominent line of questioning 
pursued by Senators of each party. The latter focus was evident when Senators of each 
party spoke of previous nominees, precedent, and procedure. In highlighting each of 
these two foci, it is my hope that a narrative about the express and desired information 
policy of this instance of the Senate Judiciary Committee would emerge as well as an 
intelligible ‘timeline’ of sorts about the evolution of contemporaneous thought on Brett 
Kavanaugh, his nomination, and confirmation hearings. 
 During the process of coding when Senators brought up information policy, I 
highlighted their statements in yellow. Because information policy is a developing field 
and the term itself is not commonly used, no Senator referred to information policy 
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directly. Instead I carefully examined the definition of information policy laid out in 
Sandra Braman’s foundational article, “Defining Information Policy” in the inaugural 
edition of the Journal of Information Policy and determined whether statements dealt 
with matters that could be considered information policy.67  
 When Senators brought up Senate Judiciary Committee rules/procedure I 
highlighted their statements in orange. The way these hearings are run is important to 
understanding the philosophy of the chairman. On the first day many Senators in the 
minority attempted to raise questions about whether the hearings could proceed. They 
attempted to raise points of order about the documents received the previous night, they 
attempted to call the hearing into regular order, and they introduced motions to adjourn. 
The chairman believed that it was within his right to continue the hearing and ignore 
procedural question.  
I sometimes had difficulty distinguishing whether a Senator was raising an issue 
that was a matter of Senate Judiciary Committee policy, procedure, rules, or precedent, or 
whether the issue was a matter of information policy. There was certainly overlap, and 
when there was, I would either break up the highlighting of a sentence into constituent 
parts that most closely aligned with each matter or default to highlighting the section 
yellow as a deference to the generality and greater importance of information policy to 
my research.  
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5. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
Access to records created by Brett Kavanaugh while he served in public office 
relates directly to information policy because these records are associated with his tenure 
in the White House and, as such, are legally classified as public documents. The 
information policy of the federal government of the United States can be characterized by 
examining and describing the flow of information not only between branches, but also to 
the public. Therefore, the decision making and other processes around access to and use 
of Kavanaugh’s records during his confirmation hearing is an important test of the check 
that Congress provides in the appointment of Judicial nominees. In their actions and 
public statements, the National Archives and Records Administration makes clear their 
position on federal information policy, and by fulfilling their duty in this case they 
expressed to the American public their idea of the role and nature of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee. 
The prevailing issue of information policy that the public came to witness and 
understand first was the delivery of 42,000 pages to members of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee on the night before the first day of the scheduled hearing. Minority Senators 
brought up this issues first thing because they took great umbrage with this “document 
dump” and therefore made several efforts to adjourn the meeting. The actor most 
responsible for this delivery of 42,000 pages (as part of 5,148 documents) was William 
55 
 
 
A. Burck.68 Burck was the lawyer who led the team of lawyers hired by George W. Bush 
to be his representatives under the Presidential Records Act. The Senate Judiciary 
Committee twitter account announced mere hours after the documents were released to 
members that the majority had concluded its review of “each and every one of these 
pages”. This was countered during the hearing the following day when, “Sen. Sheldon 
Whitehouse (D-R.I.) noted … that reviewing that many documents so quickly would 
require majority staffers to process documents at a rate of 7000 pages per hour”.69 Not 
only were these documents given to members in a time frame in which it would be 
impossible for a comprehensive review, Burck also requested that members keep these 
documents from the public and classified them “committee confidential”. This document 
dump was flashy and caused a lot of concern by members of the committee, the media, 
and the public. While it is an excellent metaphor for the entire process (in that minority 
members were excluded, and the majority expressed total satisfaction with information 
provided) it only scratches the surface of the struggle that took place in the weeks leading 
up to the hearings. Since there are a large number of documents, many actors who 
influenced this process, and several letters sent back and forth between the National 
Archives and Records Administration and members of the Senate Judiciary Committee it 
is best to go through the process of document requests before the hearing chronologically. 
The document dump was the last major event to take place before the hearing. 
On July 9th, 2018 President Donald Trump nominated Brett Kavanaugh to the 
Supreme Court, and his nomination paperwork was officially submitted to the Senate a 
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day later. Shortly thereafter he began meeting with Republican members of Congress. In 
keeping with the tradition begun by Nixon nominee Harry Blackmun as a way to smooth 
the way towards confirmation after three unsuccessful Supreme Court nominations in 
Fortas, Haynsworth and Carswell. Kavanaugh was guided by former member of the 
Senate Judiciary Committee Jon Kyl and White House Counsel Don McGahn.70 Of note 
is that fact that Senate Judiciary Committee chairman Charles Grassley sat down with 
Kyl the day prior to their first round of Senate meetings on Monday July 9th, informed 
him of who the nominee would be and by the next day, “one of Kyl’s lobbying clients, 
the conservative Judicial Crisis Network, had unveiled a 30-second TV spot touting 
Kavanaugh’s biography and a $1.4 million initial advertising buy in the home states of 
four centrist Democrats seen as potential votes for confirmation: Joe Manchin III of West 
Virginia, Joe Donnelly of Indiana, Heidi Heitkamp of North Dakota and Doug Jones of 
Alabama”.71 From the first day of this nomination process powerful interests groups were 
already organizing and launching efforts to help Brett Kavanaugh get confirmed to the 
Supreme Court. 
In addition to the hearings themselves I closely read the correspondence that 
Senate Judiciary members exchanged with the National Archives and Records 
Administration. (This correspondence is currently located on a webpage in the larger 
NARA website, beneath a section on the Freedom of Information Act.72) Shortly after 
Kavanaugh was nominated Ranking member Senator Dianne Feinstein and Chairman 
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Charles Grassley began to engage in conversations via an exchange of a series of letters 
with Archivist of the United States David Ferriero and NARA General Counsel Gary M. 
Stern. These letters illustrate each party’s understanding and arguments about the 
Presidential Records Act. 
On July 21st, 2018 Judiciary Committee ranking member Dianne Feinstein wrote 
to the National Archives and Records Administration to express concern about the way 
records were being processed and prepared for the Senate Judiciary Committee. She 
mentions a briefing of the Senate Judiciary Committee by representatives of the George 
W. Bush Presidential Library that caused her to question whether or not, “legal 
requirements are being followed…”. She went on to state “This briefing revealed several 
potential and critical departures from the requirements of the Presidential Records Act”.73 
She summarized that the representatives at the briefing indicated that a team of private 
lawyers would be responsible for the initial document review and determination of which 
documents would be released to Congress or the public. Feinstein argues that this was 
inappropriate since NARA has already had custody of these documents for nine years and 
advocated for “a more limited review by the National Archives to determine the 
applicability of statutory restrictions on access”.74 In her conclusion she reiterates her 
argument that the hiring of outside lawyers is not only inappropriate but illegal and 
emphasizes that, “Obtaining the full record is critical for the Judiciary Committee and full 
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Senate to fulfill our constitutional duty to provide advice and consent on Judge 
Kavanaugh's nomination”.75 
Before David Ferriero had a chance to reply Chairman of the Judiciary 
Committee, Charles Grassley, responded to Senator Feinstein with a letter addressed to 
the Archivist of the United States. He began by expressing “I wish to comment on the 
Ranking Member's misreading of the facts and law”.76 He continues by stating that the 
Presidential Records Act confers “a right of special access to Presidential records without 
regard to any of the six restrictions on public access to those records under the PRA” and 
“representatives of former President George W. Bush have made, at President Bush's 
direction, a request for access to certain records pertaining to Judge Brett Kavanaugh's 
service in the White House from 2001 to 2006”.77 Grassley here is expressing a view of 
the Presidential Records Act that grants the President and his representatives preemptive 
authority. He continues with a statement that can only be characterized as the most broad 
and expansive view of the powers of PRA representatives. “I further understand that, 
consistent with the PRA, you turned over those records to the PRA representatives 
without reviewing them for PRA-restricted material. And, as you know, the PRA imposes 
no restrictions on the PRA representatives' use of those records once you have turned 
them over to their custody, subject only to whatever direction they may receive from 
President Bush.” The chairman then accuses the ranking member of misunderstanding 
how the PRA operates in the context of a Supreme Court nomination and claims that her 
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concerns are premature since there had not yet been a records request by the Senate 
Judiciary Committee.  
On July 26th, 2018 David Ferriero responded to these two letters, but primarily 
responded to ranking member Dianne Feinstein. Critically he states, “As my staff has 
discussed with your staff, the authority of a committee to make requests under this 
subsection lies exclusively with the Chair of the committee, which NARA has carefully 
followed since the PRA was enacted”.78 The Archivist was keeping with precedent. A 
difference, however, is that in the past ranking members have been included in the 
process with the Senate Judiciary committee Chairman and the scope of the records 
requested were agreed upon in advance of the official records request. The Archivist 
reassures ranking member Feinstein that “We are also processing FOIA requests for other 
records related to Judge Kavanaugh. In response to these FOIA requests, our staff has to 
review for and withhold information subject to the applicable PRA restrictions and FOIA 
exemptions. Once we have completed our review, we must provide notification to the 
representatives of the former and incumbent Presidents in accordance with section 2208 
of the PRA before we can release them to the public”.79 This can be read as an attempt to 
placate Feinstein since the Archivist is informing her that the minority party of the 
Judiciary Committee has no standing above that which regular citizens have. 
On July 27th, 2018 Ranking member Dianne Feinstein expressed her 
dissatisfaction to the Archivist on his narrow reading of the Presidential Records act. She 
states that this position is inconsistent with the position that Chairman Grassley has taken 
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about requests from regular members of Congress and the Ranking member.80 She also 
summarized the Archivist’s previous letter as essentially giving the authority to decide 
which records will be provided to Congress. 
On the same day, Chairman Charles Grassley sent the official records request to 
Patrick Mordente, the Director of the George W. Bush Presidential Library. It is 
important to examine the precise phrasing of which records were included in this request: 
 
(1) Emails sent to or received from Kavanaugh, including emails on which 
he was a carbon copy or blind carbon copy recipient, during the period 
Kavanaugh served as Associate Counsel and Senior Associate Counsel to 
the President, including any documents attached to such emails;  
 
(2) The textual records contained in Kavanaugh' s office files from the 
period during which he served as Associate Counsel and Senior Associate 
Counsel to the President; and 
 
(3) Documents relating to Kavanaugh's nomination to the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
 
The records request neglects entirely to ask for any records that relate to Kavanaugh’s 
time as White House Staff Secretary. This was pointed out in Ranking member Dianne 
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Feinstein’s previous letter, so presumably she received this official records request before 
it was sent to the George W. Bush Presidential Library director. 
 The correspondence between Senate Judiciary committee Chairman Charles 
Grassley, Ranking member Dianne Feinstein, Archivist David Ferriero, NARA General 
Counsel, G.W. Bush Library representatives and Democratic Senators continued up until 
the first day of hearings. Essentially the National Archives and Records Administration 
did not recognize the authority of Ranking member Dianne Feinstein to request records 
as part of her constitutional duty to advise and consent the President on his Supreme 
Court nominee. Minority members responded by coming together and filing a FOIA 
request for Kavanaugh’s records from his service as Assistant to the President and Staff 
Secretary, but the Director and Supervisory Archivist for the G.W. Bush Presidential 
Library reiterated that the requested records were covered under the Presidential Records 
Act. 
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Legacy of the George W. Bush Administration Assault on Open 
Government 
According to the Presidential Records act executive branch information (or 
presidential records) belong to the American public. It follows then that when a former 
executive branch employee is nominated to the Supreme Court, and the Senate Judiciary 
Committee exercises its constitutional duty to advise the current President on that 
nominee then they should have access to all presidential records generated by the 
executive branch employee. This is not what happened in the Kavanaugh confirmation 
hearing. Instead the process was subverted when the majority leader of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee diverged from tradition and did not consult with the minority 
member on which records to request. The Archivist of the United States had a difficult 
decision to make when confronted with disparate requests from the chairman and the 
ranking member. This process was further tainted when the Bush-Cheney administration 
was allowed to continue their assault on open government by hiring William A. Burck 
and a team of outside lawyers to decide which documents were relevant, which relevant 
documents of those were permissible to be released to the public and which were to be 
designated ‘committee confidential’. Burck then decided that it was appropriate to 
produce nearly 42,000 pages of documents that he designated committee confidential the 
night before the first day of the hearing. There were an additional 27,110 documents from 
the White House counsel’s office, totaling 101,921 pages, that were completely withheld 
from the Senate Judiciary Committee because of intervention by the Trump White House 
and the Justice Department. 
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Constitutional Complications of Oversight of Executive Branch Information: 
Informal Influences on Information Policy and Establishing Narratives 
Although U.S. Nixon is recognized as a key court case for the balance of powers, 
a consensus on its actual implications for the current operations of the federal 
government is nonexistent. At the core the tension arises from the constitutional system 
of checks and balances provided for in the Appointments Clause. There is a potential for 
conflict because the goals and aims of the President, the Senate and the public are not 
going to always align. The modern context of our two-party political system and 
asymmetrical political polarization caused a unique position in the Senate where the 
majority was highly motivated to seat this nominee. The constitutional separation of 
powers that is the foundation of the Appointments Clause as laid out in Article II Section 
2 of the Constitution is intended to prevent an abuse of power by the President appointing 
unqualified nominees. One of the most important nominations that the Senate meets to 
advise and consent on is those judicial nominees that sit on the highest courts. In the 
context of the modern judiciary that translates to judges on both the Supreme Court and 
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The D.C. Circuit 
Court is a key because so many judges are nominated to the Supreme Court from this 
lower Court. 
As stated in the introduction the most important aspect of information policy that 
was raised during these hearings was access to the record of Judge Brett M. Kavanaugh 
by the Senate Judiciary Committee, and by extension the American public. After noticing 
something of a pattern I went back to specifically search the transcripts for several terms. 
I was hearing multiple Senators using similar words to describe the same sentiments. 
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They would use hyperbole to describe Kavanaugh as one of the most, and sometimes 
even the most qualified candidate ever nominated. They would similarly describe his 
academic record as in hyperbolic terms such as “impeccable” and “unparalleled”. The 
Democratic members had a pattern of mentioning documents that were denied to the 
committee. 
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6. OPPORTUNITIES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 Using the research method of a historical case study, I hope that I have 
demonstrated that within each nomination hearing three things that touch on information 
policy occur. The first is that Members of the Senate Judiciary Committee raise questions 
that directly and indirectly address issues of information policy. Nominees are asked and 
expected to comment on and illustrate their opinions and perspectives about information 
policy. The second is that the Senate Judiciary committee is required to perform an 
exercise in information policy when the Chairman requests information about a nominee. 
With this case the request for records was a central debate between members of the 
majority and minority. In other cases, it may not be as important. And the third is that 
Many of the issues which inform judicial philosophy touch on information policy. 
I have not explicitly intended for the research methodology outlined here to be 
generalizable to other Supreme Court Confirmation Hearings. However, it would seem 
plausible that these methods could be used as a guideline for developing research 
questions and a means of analyzing future Supreme Court Confirmation Hearings. The 
first topic of questions of information policy raised by Senate Judiciary Committee 
members will continue to be relevant so long as nominees are questions about their 
judicial philosophy and would therefore be a ripe and relevant topic of inquiry for most if 
not all Supreme Court nominees. However, the second topic of information policy 
expressed by the Senate Judiciary Committee expressed via the request for records 
66 
 
 
created by the nominee will be relevant only if the nominee worked in the Federal 
government, and potentially only so if the nominee worked for a former President or 
generally within the executive branch. The records request that is submitted to the 
National Archives and Records Administration is an incredibly important aspect of this 
process. 
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Appendices 
A. 44 U.S. Code Chapter 21 - NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND 
RECORDS ADMINISTRATION 
§ 2101. Definitions 
As used in this chapter— 
(1) “Presidential archival depository” means an institution operated by the United States to house and preserve the papers 
and books of a President or former President of the United States, together with other historical materials belonging to a 
President or former President of the United States, or related to his papers or to the events of his official or personal life, 
and may include research facilities and museum facilities in accordance with this chapter; 
(2) “historical materials” including books, correspondence, documents, papers, pamphlets, works of art, models, pictures, 
photographs, plats, maps, films, motion pictures, sound recordings, and other objects or materials having historical or 
commemorative value; 
(3) “Archivist” means the Archivist of the United States appointed under section 2103 of this title; and 
(4) “Administration” means the National Archives and Records Administration established under section 2102 of this title. 
 
§ 2102. Establishment 
There shall be an independent establishment in the executive branch of the Government to be known as the National 
Archives and Records Administration. The Administration shall be administered under the supervision and direction of the 
Archivist. 
 
§ 2103. Officers 
(a) The Archivist of the United States shall be appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. 
The Archivist shall be appointed without regard to political affiliations and solely on the basis of the professional 
qualifications required to perform the duties and responsibilities of the office of Archivist. The Archivist may be removed 
from office by the President. The President shall communicate the reasons for any such removal to each House of the 
Congress. 
(b) The Archivist shall be compensated at the rate provided for level III of the Executive Schedule under section 5314 of 
title 5. 
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(c) There shall be in the Administration a Deputy Archivist of the United States, who shall be appointed by and who shall 
serve at the pleasure of the Archivist. The Deputy Archivist shall be established as a career reserved position in the Senior 
Executive Service within the meaning of section 3132(a)(8) of title 5. The Deputy Archivist shall perform such functions 
as the Archivist shall designate. During any absence or disability of the Archivist, the Deputy Archivist shall act as 
Archivist. In the event of a vacancy in the office of the Archivist, the Deputy Archivist shall act as Archivist until an 
Archivist is appointed under subsection (a). 
 
§ 2104. Administrative provisions 
(a) The Archivist shall prescribe such regulations as the Archivist deems necessary to effectuate the functions of the 
Archivist, and the head of each executive agency shall cause to be issued such orders and directives as such agency head 
deems necessary to carry out such regulations. 
(b) Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the Archivist may delegate any of the functions of the Archivist to such 
officers and employees of the Administration as the Archivist may designate, and may authorize such successive 
redelegations of such functions as the Archivist may deem to be necessary or appropriate. A delegation of functions by the 
Archivist shall not relieve the Archivist of responsibility for the administration of such functions. 
(c) The Archivist may organize the Administration as the Archivist finds necessary or appropriate. 
(d) The Archivist is authorized to establish, maintain, alter, or discontinue such regional, local, or other field offices as the 
Archivist finds necessary or appropriate to perform the functions of the Archivist or the Administration. 
(e) The Archivist shall cause a seal of office to be made for the Administration of such design as the Archivist shall 
approve. Judicial notice shall be taken of such seal. 
(f) The Archivist may establish advisory committees to provide advice with respect to any function of the Archivist or the 
Administration. Members of any such committee shall serve without compensation but shall be entitled to transportation 
expenses and per diem in lieu of subsistence in accordance with section 5703 of title 5. 
(g) The Archivist shall advise and consult with interested Federal agencies with a view to obtaining their advice and 
assistance in carrying out the purposes of this chapter. 
(h) If authorized by the Archivist, officers and employees of the Administration having investigatory functions are 
empowered, while engaged in the performance of their duties in conducting investigations, to administer oaths. 
 
§ 2105. Personnel and services 
(a) 
(1) The Archivist is authorized to select, appoint, employ, and fix the compensation of such officers and 
employees, pursuant to part III of title 5, as are necessary to perform the functions of the Archivist and the 
Administration. 
(2) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), the Archivist is authorized to appoint, subject to the consultation 
requirements set forth in paragraph (f)(2) of section 2203 of this title,[1] a director at each Presidential archival 
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depository established under section 2112 of this title. The Archivist may appoint a director without regard to 
subchapter I and subchapter VIII of chapter 33 of title 5, United States Code, governing appointments in the 
competitive service and the Senior Executive Service. A director so appointed shall be responsible for the care 
and preservation of the Presidential records and historical materials deposited in a Presidential archival 
depository, shall serve at the pleasure of the Archivist and shall perform such other functions as the Archivist 
may specify. 
(b) The Archivist is authorized to obtain the services of experts and consultants under section 3109 of title 5. 
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 973 of title 10 or any other provision of law, the Archivist, in carrying out the 
functions of the Archivist or the Administration, is authorized to utilize in the Administration the services of officials, 
officers, and other personnel in other Federal agencies, including personnel of the armed services, with the consent of the 
head of the agency concerned. 
(d) Notwithstanding section 1342 of title 31, United States Code, the Archivist is authorized to accept and utilize voluntary 
and uncompensated services. 
 
§ 2106. Reports to Congress 
The Archivist shall submit to the Congress, in January of each year and at such other times as the Archivist 
finds appropriate, a report concerning the administration of functions of the Archivist, the Administration, the 
National Historical Publications and Records Commission, and the National Archives Trust Fund. Such report 
shall describe— 
(1) program administration and expenditures of funds, both appropriated and nonappropriated, by the Administration, the 
Commission, and the Trust Fund Board; 
(2) research projects and publications undertaken by Commission grantees, and by Trust Fund grantees, including detailed 
information concerning the receipt and use of all appropriated and nonappropriated funds; 
(3) by account, the moneys, securities, and other personal property received and held by the National Archives Trust Fund 
Board, and of its operations, including a listing of the purposes for which funds are transferred to the National Archives 
and Records Administration for expenditure to other Federal agencies; and 
(4) the matters specified in section 2904(c)(8) of this title. 
 
§ 2107. Acceptance of records for historical preservation 
(a)In General.—When it appears to the Archivist to be in the public interest, the Archivist may— 
(1) accept for deposit with the National Archives of the United States the records of a Federal agency, the Congress, the 
Architect of the Capitol, or the Supreme Court determined by the Archivist to have sufficient historical or other value to 
warrant their continued preservation by the United States Government; 
(2) direct and effect the transfer of records of a Federal agency determined by the Archivist to have sufficient historical or 
other value to warrant their continued preservation by the United States Government to the National Archives of the United 
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States, as soon as practicable, and at a time mutually agreed upon by the Archivist and the head of that Federal agency not 
later than thirty years after such records were created or received by that agency, unless the head of such agency has 
certified in writing to the Archivist that such records must be retained in the custody of such agency for use in the conduct 
of the regular business of the agency; 
(3) direct and effect, with the approval of the head of the originating Federal agency, or if the existence of the agency has 
been terminated, with the approval of the head of that agency’s successor in function, if any, the transfer of records, 
deposited or approved for deposit with the National Archives of the United States to public or educational institutions or 
associations; title to the records to remain vested in the United States unless otherwise authorized by Congress; and 
(4) transfer materials from private sources authorized to be received by the Archivist by section 2111 of this title. 
(b)Early Transfer of Records.—The Archivist— 
(1) in consultation with the head of the originating Federal agency, is authorized to accept a copy of the records described 
in subsection (a)(2) that have been in existence for less than thirty years; and 
(2) may not disclose any such records until the expiration of— 
(A) the thirty-year period described in paragraph (1); 
(B) any longer period established by the Archivist by order; or 
(C) any shorter period agreed to by the originating Federal agency. 
 
§ 2108. Responsibility for custody, use, and withdrawal of records 
(a) The Archivist shall be responsible for the custody, use, and withdrawal of records transferred to him. When records, the use of 
which is subject to statutory limitations and restrictions, are so transferred, permissive and restrictive statutory provisions with respect 
to the examination and use of records applicable to the head of the agency from which the records were transferred or to employees of 
that agency are applicable to the Archivist and to the employees of the National Archives and Records Administration, respectively. 
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, when the head of a Federal agency states, in writing, restrictions that appear to 
him to be necessary or desirable in the public interest with respect to the use or examination of rec-ords being considered for transfer 
from his custody to the Archivist, the Archivist shall, if he concurs,,[1] impose such restrictions on the records so transferred, and may 
not relax or remove such restrictions without the written concurrence of the head of the agency from which the material was 
transferred, or of his successor in function, if any. In the event that a Federal agency is terminated and there is no successor in 
function, the Archivist is authorized to relax, remove, or impose restrictions on such agency’s records when he determines that such 
action is in the public interest. Statutory and other restrictions referred to in this subsection shall remain in force until the records have 
been in existence for thirty years unless the Archivist by order, having consulted with the head of the transferring Federal agency or 
his successor in function, determines, with respect to specific bodies of records, that for reasons consistent with standards established 
in relevant statutory law, such restrictions shall remain in force for a longer period. Restriction on the use or examination of records 
deposited with the National Archives of the United States imposed by section 3 of the National Archives Act, approved June 19, 1934, 
shall continue in force regardless of the expiration of the tenure of office of the official who imposed them but may be removed or 
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relaxed by the Archivist with the concurrence in writing of the head of the agency from which material was transferred or of his 
successor in function, if any. 
(b) With regard to the census and survey rec-ords of the Bureau of the Census containing data identifying individuals enumerated in 
population censuses, any release pursuant to this section of such identifying information contained in such records shall be made by 
the Archivist pursuant to the specifications and agreements set forth in the exchange of correspondence on or about the date of 
October 10, 1952, between the Director of the Bureau of the Census and the Archivist of the United States, together with all 
amendments thereto, now or hereafter entered into between the Director of the Bureau of the Census and the Archivist of the United 
States. Such amendments, if any, shall be published in the Register. 
 
§ 2109. Preservation, arrangement, duplication, exhibition of records 
The Archivist shall provide for the preservation, arrangement, repair and rehabilitation, duplication and reproduction (including 
microcopy publications), description, and exhibition of records or other documentary material transferred to him as may be needful or 
appropriate, including the preparation and publication of inventories, indexes, catalogs, and other finding aids or guides to facilitate 
their use. He may also prepare guides and other finding aids to Federal records and, when approved by the National Historical 
Publications and Records Commission, publish such historical works and collections of sources as seem appropriate for printing or 
otherwise recording at the public expense. 
 
§ 2110. Servicing records 
The Archivist shall provide and maintain facilities he considers necessary or desirable for servicing records in his custody that are not 
exempt from examination by statutory or other restrictions. 
 
§ 2111. Material accepted for deposit 
(a)In General.—When the Archivist considers it to be in the public interest the Archivist may accept for deposit— 
(1) the papers and other historical materials of a President or former President of the United States, or other official or 
former official of the Government, and other papers relating to and contemporary with a President or former President of 
the United States, subject to restrictions agreeable to the Archivist as to their use; and 
(2) recorded information (as such term is defined in section 3301(a)(2) of this title) from private sources that are 
appropriate for preservation by the Government as evidence of its organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures, 
and transactions. 
(b)Exception.— 
This section shall not apply in the case of any Presidential records which are subject to the provisions of chapter 22 of this title. 
§ 2112. Presidential archival depository 
(a) 
(1) When the Archivist considers it to be in the public interest, the Archivist may— 
(A) 
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(i) accept, for and in the name of the United States, land, a facility, and equipment offered as a gift to 
the United States for the purpose of creating a Presidential archival depository; 
(ii) take title to the land, facility, and equipment on behalf of the United States; and 
(iii) maintain, operate, and protect the land, facility, and equipment as a Presidential archival 
depository and as part of the national archives system; 
(B) 
(i) make agreements, upon terms and conditions the Archivist considers proper, with a State, 
political subdivision, university, institution of higher learning, institute, or foundation to use as a 
Presidential archival depository land, a facility, and equipment of the State, subdivision, university, 
or other organization, to be made available by it without transfer of title to the United States; and 
(ii) maintain, operate, and protect the depository as a part of the national archives system; and 
(C) accept, for and in the name of the United States, gifts offered for the purpose of making any physical or 
material change or addition to a Presidential archival depository. 
(2) The Archivist shall promulgate architectural and design standards applicable to Presidential archival depositories in 
order to ensure that such depositories (A) preserve Presidential records subject to chapter 22 of this title and papers and 
other historical materials accepted for deposit under section 2111 of this title and (B) contain adequate research facilities. 
(3) Prior to accepting and taking title to any land, facility, or equipment under subparagraph (A) of paragraph (1), or prior 
to entering into any agreement under subparagraph (B) of such paragraph or any other agreement to accept or establish a 
Presidential archival depository, the Archivist shall submit a written report on the proposed Presidential archival depository 
to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. The report shall include— 
(A) a description of the land, facility, and equipment offered as a gift or to be made available without transfer of 
title; 
(B) a statement specifying the estimated total cost of the proposed depository and the amount of the endowment 
for the depository required pursuant to subsection (g) of this section; 
(C) a statement of the terms of the proposed agreement, if any; 
(D) a general description of the types of papers, documents, or other historical materials proposed to be 
deposited in the depository to be created, and of the terms of the proposed deposit; 
(E) a statement of any additional improvements and equipment associated with the development and operation 
of the depository, an estimate of the costs of such improvements and equipment, and a statement as to the extent 
to which such costs will be incurred by any Federal or State government agency; 
(F) an estimate of the total annual cost to the United States of maintaining, operating, and protecting the 
depository; and 
(G) a certification that such facility and equipment (whether offered as a gift or made available without transfer 
of title) comply with standards promulgated by the Archivist pursuant to paragraph (2) of this subsection. 
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(4) Prior to accepting any gift under subparagraph (C) of paragraph (1) for the purpose of making any physical or material 
change or addition to a Presidential archival depository, or prior to implementing any provision of law requiring the 
making of such a change or addition, the Archivist shall submit a report in writing on the proposed change or addition to 
the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. The report shall include— 
(A) a description of such gift; 
(B) a statement specifying the estimated total cost of the proposed physical or material change or addition and 
the amount of the deposit in an endowment for the depository required pursuant to subsection (g) of this section 
in order to meet the cost of such change or addition; 
(C) a statement of the purpose of the proposed change or addition and a general description of any papers, 
documents, or historical materials proposed to be deposited in the depository as a result of such change or 
addition; 
(D) a statement of any additional improvements or equipment for the depository associated with such change or 
addition; 
(E) an estimate of the increase in the total annual cost to the United States of maintaining, operating, and 
protecting the depository that will result from such change or addition; and 
(F) a certification that the depository, and the equipment therein will, after such change or addition, comply 
with the standards promulgated by the Archivist pursuant to paragraph (2) of this subsection. 
(5) The Archivist may not— 
(A) accept or take title to land, a facility, or equipment under subparagraph (A) of paragraph (1) for the purpose 
of creating a Presidential archival depository; 
(B) enter into any agreement under subparagraph (B) of such paragraph or any other agreement to accept or 
establish a Presidential archival depository; or 
(C) accept any gift under subparagraph (C) of such paragraph for the purpose of making any physical or 
material change to a Presidential archival depository, 
until the expiration of a period of 60 days of continuous session of Congress beginning on the date 
on which the Archivist transmits the report required under paragraph (3) of this subsection with 
respect to such Presidential archival depository or the report required under paragraph (4) of this 
subsection with respect to such change or addition, as the case may be. 
(b) When the Archivist considers it to be in the public interest, he may deposit in a Presidential archival depository papers, documents, 
or other historical materials accepted under section 2111 of this title, or Federal records appropriate for preservation. 
(c) When the Archivist considers it to be in the public interest, he may exercise, with respect to papers, documents, or other historical 
materials deposited under this section, or otherwise, in a Presidential archival depository, all the functions and responsibilities 
otherwise vested in him pertaining to Federal records or other documentary materials in his custody or under his control. The 
Archivist, in negotiating for the deposit of Presidential historical materials, shall take steps to secure to the Government, as far as 
possible, the right to have continuous and permanent possession of the materials. Papers, documents, or other historical materials 
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accepted and deposited under section 2111 of this title and this section are subject to restrictions as to their availability and use stated 
in writing by the donors or depositors, including the restriction that they shall be kept in a Presidential archival depository. The 
restrictions shall be respected for the period stated, or until revoked or terminated by the donors or depositors or by persons legally 
qualified to act on their behalf. Subject to the restrictions, the Archivist may dispose by sale, exchange, or otherwise, of papers, 
documents, or other materials which the Archivist determines to have no permanent value or historical interest or to be surplus to the 
needs of a Presidential archival depository. Only the first two sentences of this subsection shall apply to Presidential records as 
defined in section 2201(2) of this title. 
(d) When the Archivist considers it to be in the public interest, he may cooperate with and assist a university, institution of higher 
learning, institute, foundation, or other organization or qualified individual to further or to conduct study or research in historical 
materials deposited in a Presidential archival depository. 
(e) When the Archivist considers it to be in the public interest, he may charge and collect reasonable fees for the privilege of visiting 
and viewing exhibit rooms or museum space, or for the occasional, non-official use of rooms and spaces (and services related to such 
use), in a Presidential archival depository. 
(f) When the Archivist considers it to be in the public interest, he may provide reasonable office space in a Presidential archival 
depository for the personal use of a former President of the United States. 
(g) 
(1) When the Archivist considers it to be in the public interest, the Archivist may solicit and accept gifts or bequests of 
money or other property for the purpose of maintaining, operating, protecting, or improving a Presidential archival 
depository. The proceeds of gifts or bequests, together with the proceeds from fees or from sales of historical materials, 
copies or reproductions, catalogs, or other items, having to do with a Presidential archival depository, shall be paid into an 
account in the National Archives Trust Fund and shall be held, administered, and expended for the benefit and in the 
interest of the Presidential archival depository in connection with which they were received, and for the same purposes and 
objects, including custodial and administrative services for which appropriations for the maintenance, operation, 
protection, or improvement of Presidential archival depositories might be expended. 
(2) The Archivist shall provide for the establishment in such Trust Fund of separate endowments for the maintenance of the 
land, facility, and equipment of each Presidential archival depository, to which shall be credited any gifts or bequests 
received under paragraph (1) that are offered for that purpose. Income to each such endowment shall be available to cover 
the cost of facility operations, but shall not be available for the performance of archival functions under this title. 
(3) The Archivist shall not accept or take title to any land, facility, or equipment under subparagraph (A) of subsection 
(a)(1), or enter into any agreement to use any land, facility, or equipment under subparagraph (B) of such subsection for the 
purpose of creating a Presidential archival depository, unless the Archivist determines that there is available, by gift or 
bequest for deposit under paragraph (2) of this subsection in an endowment with respect to such depository, an amount for 
the purpose of maintaining such land, facility, and equipment equal to— 
(A) the product of— 
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(i) the total cost of acquiring or constructing such facility and of acquiring and installing such 
equipment, multiplied by 
(ii) 20 percent; plus 
(B) 
(i) if title to the land is to be vested in the United States, the product of— 
(I) the total cost of acquiring the land upon which such facility is located, or such other 
measure of the value of such land as is mutually agreed upon by the Archivist and the 
donor, multiplied by 
(II) 20 percent; or 
(ii) if title to the land is not to be vested in the United States, the product of— 
(I) the total cost to the donor of any improvements to the land upon which such facility is 
located (other than such facility and equipment), multiplied by 
(II) 20 percent; plus 
(C) if the Presidential archival depository will exceed 70,000 square feet in area, an amount equal to the product 
of— 
(i) the sum of— 
(I) the total cost described in clause (i) of subparagraph (A); plus 
(II) the total cost described in subclause (I) or (II) of subparagraph (B)(i), as the case may 
be, multiplied by 
(ii) the percentage obtained by dividing the number of square feet by which such depository will 
exceed 70,000 square feet by 70,000. 
(4) If a proposed physical or material change or addition to a Presidential archival depository would result in an increase in 
the costs of facility operations, the Archivist may not accept any gift under subparagraph (C) of paragraph (1) for the 
purpose of making such a change or addition, or may not implement any provision of law requiring the making of such a 
change or addition, unless the Archivist determines that there is available, by gift or bequest for deposit under paragraph 
(2) of this subsection in an endowment with respect to such depository, an amount for the purpose of maintaining the land, 
facility, and equipment of such depository equal to the difference between— 
(A) the amount which, pursuant to paragraph (3) of this subsection, would have been required to have been 
available for deposit in such endowment with respect to such depository if such change or addition had been 
included in such depository on— 
(i) the date on which the Archivist took title to the land, facility, and equipment for such depository 
under subparagraph (A) of subsection (a)(1); or 
(ii) the date on which the Archivist entered into an agreement for the creation of such depository 
under subparagraph (B) of such paragraph, 
as the case may be; minus 
83 
 
 
(B) the amount which, pursuant to paragraph (3) of this subsection, was required to be available for deposit in 
such endowment with respect to such depository on the date the Archivist took such title or entered into such 
agreement, as the case may be. 
(5) 
(A) Notwithstanding paragraphs (3) and (4) (to the extent that such paragraphs are inconsistent with this 
paragraph), this subsection shall be administered in accordance with this paragraph with respect to any 
Presidential archival depository created as a depository for the papers, documents, and other historical materials 
and Presidential records pertaining to any President who takes the oath of office as President for the first time 
on or after July 1, 2002. 
(B) For purposes of subparagraphs (A)(ii), (B)(i)(II), and (B)(ii)(II) of paragraph (3) the percentage of 60 
percent shall apply instead of 20 percent. 
(C) 
(i) In this subparagraph, the term “base endowment amount” means the amount of the endowment 
required under paragraph (3). 
(ii) 
(I) The Archivist may give credits against the base endowment amount if the Archivist 
determines that the proposed Presidential archival depository will have construction 
features or equipment that are expected to result in quantifiable long-term savings to the 
Government with respect to the cost of facility operations. 
(II) The features and equipment described under subclause (I) shall comply with the 
standards promulgated by the Archivist under subsection (a)(2). 
(III) The Archivist shall promulgate standards to be used in calculating the dollar amount 
of any credit to be given, and shall consult with all donors of the endowment before 
giving any credits. The total dollar amount of credits given under this paragraph may not 
exceed 20 percent of the base endowment amount. 
(D) 
(i) In calculating the additional endowment amount required under paragraph (4), the Archivist shall 
take into account credits given under subparagraph (C), and may also give credits against the 
additional endowment amount required under paragraph (4), if the Archivist determines that 
construction features or equipment used in making or equipping the physical or material change or 
addition are expected to result in quantifiable long-term savings to the Government with respect to 
the cost of facility operations. 
(ii) The features and equipment described under clause (i) shall comply with the standards 
promulgated by the Archivist under subsection (a)(2). 
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(iii) The Archivist shall promulgate standards to be used in calculating the dollar amount of any 
credit to be given, and shall consult with all donors of the endowment before giving any credits. The 
total dollar amount of credits given under this paragraph may not exceed 20 percent of the additional 
endowment amount required under paragraph (4). 
 
§ 2113. Depository for agreements between States 
The Archivist may receive duplicate originals or authenticated copies of agreements or compacts entered into under the Constitution 
and laws of the United States, between States of the Union, and take necessary actions for their preservation and servicing. 
 
§ 2114. Preservation of audio and visual records 
The Archivist may make and preserve audio and visual records, including motion-picture films, still photographs, and sound 
recordings, in analog, digital, or any other form, pertaining to and illustrative of the historical development of the United States 
Government and its activities, and provide for preparing, editing, titling, scoring, processing, duplicating, reproducing, exhibiting, and 
releasing for non-profit educational purposes, motion-picture films, still photographs, and sound recordings in the Archivist’s custody. 
 
§ 2115. Reports; correction of violations 
(a) In carrying out the duties and responsibilities under chapters 21, 25, 29, 31, and 33 of this title, the Archivist may obtain 
reports from any Federal agency on such agency’s activities under such chapters. 
(b) When the Archivist finds that a provision of any such chapter has been or is being violated, the Archivist shall (1) 
inform in writing the head of the agency concerned of the violation and make recommendations for its correction; and (2) 
unless satisfactory corrective measures are demonstrably commenced within a reasonable time, submit a written report of 
the matter to the President and the Congress. 
 
§ 2116. Legal status of reproductions; official seal; fees for copies and reproductions 
(a) When records that are required by statute to be retained indefinitely have been reproduced by photographic, 
microphotographic, digital, or other processes, in accordance with standards established by the Archivist the indefinite 
retention by the photographic, microphotographic, digital, or other reproductions constitutes compliance with the statutory 
requirement for the indefinite retention of the original records. The reproductions, as well as reproductions made under 
regulations to carry out chapter 21, 29, 31, and 33 of this title, shall have the same legal status as the originals. 
(b) There shall be an official seal for the National Archives of the United States which shall be judicially noticed. When a 
copy or reproduction, furnished under this section, is authenticated by the official seal and certified by the Archivist, the 
copy or reproduction shall be admitted in evidence equally with the original from which it was made. 
(c) The Archivist may charge a fee set to recover the costs for making or authenticating copies or reproductions of 
materials transferred to the Archivist’s custody. Such fee shall be fixed by the Archivist at a level which will recover, so far 
as practicable, all elements of such costs, and may, in the Archivist’s discretion, include increments for the estimated 
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replacement cost of equipment. Such fees shall be paid into, administered, and expended as a part of the National Archives 
Trust Fund. The Archivist may not charge for making or authenticating copies or reproductions of materials for official use 
by the United States Government unless appropriations available to the Archivist for this purpose are insufficient to cover 
the cost of performing the work. 
 
§ 2117. Limitation on liability 
When letters and other intellectual productions (exclusive of patented material, published works under copyright protection, and 
unpublished works for which copyright registration has been made) come into the custody or possession of the Archivist, the United 
States or its agents are not liable for infringement of copyright or analogous rights arising out of use of the materials for display, 
inspection, research, reproduction, or other purposes. 
 
§ 2118. Records of Congress 
The Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House of Representatives, acting jointly, shall obtain at the close of each Congress all 
the noncurrent records of the Congress and of each congressional committee and transfer them to the National Archives and Records 
Administration for preservation, subject to the orders of the Senate or the House of Representatives, respectively. 
 
§ 2119. Cooperative agreements 
(a)Authority.— 
The Archivist may enter into cooperative agreements pursuant to section 6305 of title 31 that involve the transfer of funds 
from the National Archives and Records Administration to State and local governments, other public entities, educational 
institutions, or private nonprofit organizations (including foundations or institutes organized to support the National 
Archives and Records Administration or the Presidential archival depositories operated by it) for the public purpose of 
carrying out programs of the National Archives and Records Administration. 
(b)Limitations.— 
Not more than $25,000 may be transferred under a cooperative agreement entered into as authorized by subsection (a). Not 
more than a total of $75,000 may be transferred under such agreements in any fiscal year. 
(c)Report.— 
Not later than December 31st of each year, the Archivist shall submit to the Committee on Government Reform of the 
House of Representatives and the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate a report on the provisions, amount, 
and duration of each cooperative agreement entered into as authorized by subsection (a) during the preceding fiscal year. 
 
§ 2120. Online access of founding fathers documents 
The Archivist may enter into a cooperative agreement to provide online access to the published volumes of the papers of— 
(1) George Washington; 
(2) Alexander Hamilton; 
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(3) Thomas Jefferson; 
(4) Benjamin Franklin; 
(5) John Adams; 
(6) James Madison; and 
(7) other prominent historical figures, as determined appropriate by the Archivist of the United States. 
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B. 44 U.S. Code Chapter 22 - PRESIDENTIAL RECORDS 
§ 2201. Definitions 
As used in this chapter— 
(1) The term “documentary material” means all books, correspondence, memoranda, documents, papers, pamphlets, works of art, 
models, pictures, photographs, plats, maps, films, and motion pictures, including, but not limited to, audio and visual records, or other 
electronic or mechanical recordations, whether in analog, digital, or any other form. 
(2) The term “Presidential records” means documentary materials, or any reasonably seg­regable portion thereof, created or received 
by the President, the President’s immediate staff, or a unit or individual of the Executive Office of the President whose function is to 
advise or assist the President, in the course of conducting activities which relate to or have an effect upon the carrying out of the 
constitutional, statutory, or other official or ceremonial duties of the President. Such term— 
(A) includes any documentary materials relating to the political activities of the President or members of the President’s 
staff, but only if such activities relate to or have a direct effect upon the carrying out of constitutional, statutory, or other 
official or ceremonial duties of the President; but 
(B) does not include any documentary materials that are (i) official records of an agency (as defined in section 552(e) [1] of 
title 5, United States Code); (ii) personal records; (iii) stocks of publications and stationery; or (iv) extra copies of 
documents produced only for convenience of reference, when such copies are clearly so identified. 
(3) The term “personal records” means all documentary materials, or any reasonably segregable portion therof,[2] of a purely private 
or nonpublic character which do not relate to or have an effect upon the carrying out of the constitutional, statutory, or other official or 
ceremonial duties of the President. Such term includes— 
(A) diaries, journals, or other personal notes serving as the functional equivalent of a diary or journal which are not 
prepared or utilized for, or circulated or communicated in the course of, transacting Government business; 
(B) materials relating to private political associations, and having no relation to or direct effect upon the carrying out of 
constitutional, statutory, or other official or ceremonial duties of the President; and 
(C) materials relating exclusively to the President’s own election to the office of the Presidency; and materials directly 
relating to the election of a particular individual or individuals to Federal, State, or local office, which have no relation to 
or direct effect upon the carrying out of constitutional, statutory, or other official or ceremonial duties of the President. 
(4) The term “Archivist” means the Archivist of the United States. 
(5) The term “former President”, when used with respect to Presidential records, means the former President during whose term or 
terms of office such Presidential rec-ords were created. 
 
§ 2202. Ownership of Presidential records 
The United States shall reserve and retain complete ownership, possession, and control of Presidential records; and such records shall 
be administered in accordance with the provisions of this chapter. 
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§ 2203. Management and custody of Presidential records 
(a) Through the implementation of records management controls and other necessary actions, the President shall take all such steps as 
may be necessary to assure that the activities, deliberations, decisions, and policies that reflect the performance of the President’s 
constitutional, statutory, or other official or ceremonial duties are adequately documented and that such records are preserved and 
maintained as Presidential records pursuant to the requirements of this section and other provisions of law. 
(b) Documentary materials produced or received by the President, the President’s staff, or units or individuals in the Executive Office 
of the President the function of which is to advise or assist the President, shall, to the extent practicable, be categorized as Presidential 
records or personal records upon their creation or receipt and be filed separately. 
(c) During the President’s term of office, the President may dispose of those Presidential records of such President that no longer have 
administrative, historical, informational, or evidentiary value if— 
(1) the President obtains the views, in writing, of the Archivist concerning the proposed disposal of such Presidential 
records; and 
(2) the Archivist states that the Archivist does not intend to take any action under subsection (e) of this section. 
(d) In the event the Archivist notifies the President under subsection (c) that the Archivist does intend to take action under subsection 
(e), the President may dispose of such Presidential records if copies of the disposal schedule are submitted to the appropriate 
Congressional Committees at least 60 calendar days of continuous session of Congress in advance of the proposed disposal date. For 
the purpose of this section, continuity of session is broken only by an adjournment of Congress sine die, and the days on which either 
House is not in session because of an adjournment of more than three days to a day certain are excluded in the computation of the days 
in which Congress is in continuous session. 
(e) The Archivist shall request the advice of the Committee on Rules and Administration and the Committee on Governmental Affairs 
of the Senate and the Committee on House Oversight and the Committee on Government Operations of the House of Representatives 
with respect to any proposed disposal of Presidential records whenever the Archivist considers that— 
(1) these particular records may be of special interest to the Congress; or 
(2) consultation with the Congress regarding the disposal of these particular records is in the public interest. 
(f) During a President’s term of office, the Archivist may maintain and preserve Presidential records on behalf of the President, 
including records in digital or electronic form. The President shall remain exclusively responsible for custody, control, and access to 
such Presidential records. The Archivist may not disclose any such records, except under direction of the President, until the 
conclusion of a President’s term of office, if a President serves consecutive terms upon the conclusion of the last term, or such other 
period provided for under section 2204 of this title. 
(g) 
(1) Upon the conclusion of a President’s term of office, or if a President serves consecutive terms upon the conclusion of 
the last term, the Archivist of the United States shall assume responsibility for the custody, control, and preservation of, 
and access to, the Presidential records of that President. The Archivist shall have an affirmative duty to make such records 
available to the public as rapidly and completely as possible consistent with the provisions of this chapter. 
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(2) The Archivist shall deposit all such Presidential records in a Presidential archival depository or another archival facility 
operated by the United States. The Archivist is authorized to designate, after consultation with the former President, a 
director at each depository or facility, who shall be responsible for the care and preservation of such records. 
(3) When the President considers it practicable and in the public interest, the President shall include in the President’s 
budget transmitted to Congress, for each fiscal year in which the term of office of the President will expire, such funds as 
may be necessary for carrying out the authorities of this subsection. 
(4) The Archivist is authorized to dispose of such Presidential records which the Archivist has appraised and determined to 
have insufficient administrative, historical, informational, or evidentiary value to warrant their continued preservation. 
Notice of such disposal shall be published in the Federal Register at least 60 days in advance of the proposed disposal date. 
Publication of such notice shall constitute a final agency action for purposes of review under chapter 7 of title 5, United 
States Code. 
 
§ 2204. Restrictions on access to Presidential records 
(a) Prior to the conclusion of a President’s term of office or last consecutive term of office, as the case may be, the President shall 
specify durations, not to exceed 12 years, for which access shall be restricted with respect to information, in a Presidential record, 
within one or more of the following categories: 
(1) 
(A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of 
national defense or foreign policy and (B) in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order; 
(2) relating to appointments to Federal office; 
(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than sections 552 and 552b of title 5, United States Code), 
provided that such statute (A) requires that the material be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no 
discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of material to be 
withheld; 
(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential; 
(5) confidential communications requesting or submitting advice, between the President and the President’s advisers, or 
between such advisers; or 
(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of 
personal privacy. 
(b) 
(1) Any Presidential record or reasonably segregable portion thereof containing information within a category restricted by 
the President under subsection (a) shall be so designated by the Archivist and access thereto shall be restricted until the 
earlier of— 
(A) 
(i) the date on which the former President waives the restriction on disclosure of such record, or 
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(ii) the expiration of the duration specified under subsection (a) for the category of information on 
the basis of which access to such record has been restricted; or 
(B) upon a determination by the Archivist that such record or reasonably segregable portion thereof, or of any 
significant element or aspect of the information contained in such record or reasonably segregable portion 
thereof, has been placed in the public domain through publication by the former President, or the President’s 
agents. 
(2) Any such record which does not contain information within a category restricted by the President under subsection (a), 
or contains information within such a category for which the duration of restricted access has expired, shall be exempt from 
the provisions of subsection (c) until the earlier of— 
(A) the date which is 5 years after the date on which the Archivist obtains custody of such record pursuant to 
section 2203(d)(1); [1] or 
(B) the date on which the Archivist completes the processing and organization of such records or integral file 
segment thereof. 
(3) During the period of restricted access specified pursuant to subsection (b)(1), the determination whether access to a 
Presidential record or reasonably segregable portion thereof shall be restricted shall be made by the Archivist, in the 
Archivist’s discretion, after consultation with the former President, and, during such period, such determinations shall not 
be subject to judicial review, except as provided in subsection (e) of this section. The Archivist shall establish procedures 
whereby any person denied access to a Presidential record because such record is restricted pursuant to a determination 
made under this paragraph, may file an administrative appeal of such determination. Such procedures shall provide for a 
written determination by the Archivist or the Archivist’s designee, within 30 working days after receipt of such an appeal, 
setting forth the basis for such determination. 
(c) 
(1) Subject to the limitations on access imposed pursuant to subsections (a) and (b), Presidential records shall be 
administered in accordance with section 552 of title 5, United States Code, except that paragraph (b)(5) of that section shall 
not be available for purposes of withholding any Presidential record, and for the purposes of such section such records shall 
be deemed to be records of the National Archives and Records Administration. Access to such records shall be granted on 
nondiscriminatory terms. 
(2) Nothing in this Act shall be construed to confirm, limit, or expand any constitutionally-based privilege which may be 
available to an incumbent or former President. 
(d) Upon the death or disability of a President or former President, any discretion or authority the President or former President may 
have had under this chapter, except section 2208, shall be exercised by the Archivist unless otherwise previously provided by the 
President or former President in a written notice to the Archivist. 
(e) The United States District Court for the District of Columbia shall have jurisdiction over any action initiated by the former 
President asserting that a determination made by the Archivist violates the former President’s rights or privileges. 
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(f) The Archivist shall not make available any original Presidential records to any individual claiming access to any Presidential 
record as a designated representative under section 2205(3) of this title if that individual has been convicted of a crime relating to the 
review, retention, removal, or destruction of records of the Archives. 
 
§ 2205. Exceptions to restricted access 
Notwithstanding any restrictions on access imposed pursuant to sections 2204 and 2208 of this title— 
(1) the Archivist and persons employed by the National Archives and Records Administration who are engaged in the performance of 
normal archival work shall be permitted access to Presidential records in the custody of the Archivist; 
(2) subject to any rights, defenses, or privileges which the United States or any agency or person may invoke, Presidential records 
shall be made available— 
(A) pursuant to subpoena or other judicial process issued by a court of competent jurisdiction for the purposes of any civil 
or criminal investigation or proceeding; 
(B) to an incumbent President if such records contain information that is needed for the conduct of current business of the 
incumbent President’s office and that is not otherwise available; and 
(C) to either House of Congress, or, to the extent of matter within its jurisdiction, to any committee or subcommittee 
thereof if such records contain information that is needed for the conduct of its business and that is not otherwise available; 
and 
(3) the Presidential records of a former President shall be available to such former President or the former President’s designated 
representative. 
 
§ 2206. Regulations 
The Archivist shall promulgate in accordance with section 553 of title 5, United States Code, regulations necessary to carry 
out the provisions of this chapter. Such regulations shall include— 
(1) provisions for advance public notice and description of any Presidential records scheduled for disposal pursuant to section 
2203(f)(3); 
(2) provisions for providing notice to the former President when materials to which access would otherwise be restricted pursuant to 
section 2204(a) are to be made available in accordance with section 2205(2); 
(3) provisions for notice by the Archivist to the former President when the disclosure of particular documents may adversely affect 
any rights and privileges which the former President may have; and 
(4) provisions for establishing procedures for consultation between the Archivist and appropriate Federal agencies regarding materials 
which may be subject to section 552(b)(7) of title 5, United States Code. 
 
§ 2207. Vice-Presidential records 
Vice-Presidential records shall be subject to the provisions of this chapter in the same manner as Presidential records. The duties and 
responsibilities of the Vice President, with respect to Vice-Presidential records, shall be the same as the duties and responsibilities of 
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the President under this chapter, except section 2208, with respect to Presidential records. The authority of the Archivist with respect 
to Vice-Presidential records shall be the same as the authority of the Archivist under this chapter with respect to Presidential records, 
except that the Archivist may, when the Archivist determines that it is in the public interest, enter into an agreement for the deposit of 
Vice-Presidential records in a non-Federal archival depository. Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to authorize the 
establishment of separate archival depositories for such Vice-Presidential records. 
 
§ 2208. Claims of constitutionally based privilege against disclosure 
(a) 
(1) When the Archivist determines under this chapter to make available to the public any Presidential record that has not 
previously been made available to the public, the Archivist shall— 
(A) promptly provide notice of such determination to— 
(i) the former President during whose term of office the record was created; and 
(ii) the incumbent President; and 
(B) make the notice available to the public. 
(2) The notice under paragraph (1)— 
(A) shall be in writing; and 
(B) shall include such information as may be prescribed in regulations issued by the Archivist. 
(3) 
(A) Upon the expiration of the 60-day period (excepting Saturdays, Sundays, and legal public holidays) 
beginning on the date the Archivist provides notice under paragraph (1)(A), the Archivist shall make available 
to the public the Presidential record covered by the notice, except any record (or reasonably segregable part of a 
record) with respect to which the Archivist receives from a former President or the incumbent President 
notification of a claim of constitutionally based privilege against disclosure under subsection (b). 
(B) A former President or the incumbent President may extend the period under subparagraph (A) once for not 
more than 30 additional days (excepting Saturdays, Sundays, and legal public holidays) by filing with the 
Archivist a statement that such an extension is necessary to allow an adequate review of the record. 
(C) Notwithstanding subparagraphs (A) and (B), if the 60-day period under subparagraph (A), or any extension 
of that period under subparagraph (B), would otherwise expire during the 6-month period after the incumbent 
President first takes office, then that 60-day period or extension, respectively, shall expire at the end of that 6-
month period. 
(b) 
(1) For purposes of this section, the decision to assert any claim of constitutionally based privilege against disclosure of a 
Presidential record (or reasonably segregable part of a record) must be made personally by a former President or the 
incumbent President, as applicable. 
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(2) A former President or the incumbent President shall notify the Archivist, the Committee on Oversight and Government 
Reform of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the 
Senate of a privilege claim under paragraph (1) on the same day that the claim is asserted under such paragraph. 
(c) 
(1) If a claim of constitutionally based privilege against disclosure of a Presidential record (or reasonably segregable part of 
a record) is asserted under subsection (b) by a former President, the Archivist shall consult with the incumbent President, 
as soon as practicable during the period specified in paragraph (2)(A), to determine whether the incumbent President will 
uphold the claim asserted by the former President. 
(2) 
(A) Not later than the end of the 30-day period beginning on the date on which the Archivist receives 
notification from a former President of the assertion of a claim of constitutionally based privilege against 
disclosure, the Archivist shall provide notice to the former President and the public of the decision of the 
incumbent President under paragraph (1) regarding the claim. 
(B) If the incumbent President upholds the claim of privilege asserted by the former President, the Archivist 
shall not make the Presidential record (or reasonably segregable part of a record) subject to the claim publicly 
available unless— 
(i) the incumbent President withdraws the decision upholding the claim of privilege asserted by the 
former President; or 
(ii) the Archivist is otherwise directed by a final court order that is not subject to appeal. 
(C) If the incumbent President determines not to uphold the claim of privilege asserted by the former President, 
or fails to make the determination under paragraph (1) before the end of the period specified in subparagraph 
(A), the Archivist shall release the Presidential record subject to the claim at the end of the 90-day period 
beginning on the date on which the Archivist received notification of the claim, unless otherwise directed by a 
court order in an action initiated by the former President under section 2204(e) of this title or by a court order in 
another action in any Federal court. 
(d) The Archivist shall not make publicly available a Presidential record (or reasonably segregable part of a record) that is subject to a 
privilege claim asserted by the incumbent President unless— 
(1) the incumbent President withdraws the privilege claim; or 
(2) the Archivist is otherwise directed by a final court order that is not subject to appeal. 
(e) The Archivist shall adjust any otherwise applicable time period under this section as necessary to comply with the return date of 
any congressional subpoena, judicial subpoena, or judicial process. 
§ 2209. Disclosure requirement for official business conducted using non-official electronic messaging accounts 
(a)In General.—The President, the Vice President, or a covered employee may not create or send a Presidential or Vice Presidential 
record using a non-official electronic message account unless the President, Vice President, or covered employee— 
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(1) copies an official electronic messaging account of the President, Vice President, or covered employee in the original 
creation or transmission of the Presidential record or Vice Presidential record; or 
(2) forwards a complete copy of the Presidential or Vice Presidential record to an official electronic messaging account of 
the President, Vice President, or covered employee not later than 20 days after the original creation or transmission of the 
Presidential or Vice Presidential record. 
(b)Adverse Actions.— 
The intentional violation of subsection (a) by a covered employee (including any rules, regulations, or other implementing guidelines), 
as determined by the appropriate supervisor, shall be a basis for disciplinary action in accordance with subchapter I, II, or V of chapter 
75 of title 5, as the case may be. 
(c)Definitions.—In this section: 
(1)Covered employee.—The term “covered employee” means— 
(A) the immediate staff of the President; 
(B) the immediate staff of the Vice President; 
(C) a unit or individual of the Executive Office of the President whose function is to advise and assist the 
President; and 
(D) a unit or individual of the Office of the Vice President whose function is to advise and assist the Vice 
President. 
(2)Electronic messages.— 
The term “electronic messages” means electronic mail and other electronic messaging systems that are used for purposes of 
communicating between individuals. 
(3)Electronic messaging account.— 
The term “electronic messaging account” means any account that sends electronic messages. 
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C. Timeline of Senate Judiciary Committee Members Correspondence 
with NARA and Brett Kavanaugh 
 
July 21, 
2018 
Sen. Dianne Feinstein David Ferriero, 
Archivist 
Processing Kavanaugh-related presidential 
records for access  
July 23, 
2018 
Sen. Charles Grassley David Ferriero, 
Archivist 
Response to Sen. Feinstein's July 21 letter to 
NARA 
July 26, 
2018 
David Ferriero, Archivist Sen. Dianne Feinstein Response to Sen. Feinstein's July 21 letter to 
NARA 
July 27, 
2018 
Sen. Dianne Feinstein David Ferriero, 
Archivist 
Response to July 26, 2018 letter  
July 27, 
2018 
Sen. Charles Grassley Patrick Mordente, 
Director, G.W. Bush 
Library 
Judiciary Committee Chairman's request for 
records 
July 30, 
2018 
Sen. Charles Grassley David Ferriero, 
Archivist 
Response to Sen. Feinstein's July 27 letter to 
NARA 
July 31, 
2018 
Minority Senate Judiciary 
Committee members 
Patrick Mordente, 
Director, G.W. Bush 
Library 
Minority Judiciary Committee members' 
request for records 
Aug. 2, 
2018 
Gary M. Stern, NARA 
General Counsel 
Sen. Charles Grassley Response to Sen. Grassley's July 27 letter to 
G.W. Bush Library 
Aug. 2, 
2018 
David Ferriero, Archivist Sen. Charles Schumer  Letter to Senate Minority Leader concerning 
Section 2205 of the PRA 
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Aug. 3, 
2018 
Sen. Charles Grassely and 
Sen. Dianne Feinstein  
David Ferriero, 
Archivist 
Committee's request for access to records 
from Office of Independent Counsel Kenneth 
W. Starr 
Aug. 6, 
2018 
Sen. Dianne Feinstein David Ferriero, 
Archivist 
Response to Archivist's Aug. 2, 2018 letter to 
Senate Minority Leader concerning Section 
2205 of the PRA 
Aug. 8, 
2018 
Minority Senate Judiciary 
Committee members 
Gary M. Stern, NARA 
General Counsel 
FOIA request for Kavanaugh PRA records  
Aug. 9, 
2018 
Gary M. Stern, NARA 
General Counsel 
Sen. Charles Grassely 
and Sen. Dianne 
Feinstein  
First Response to Committee's request for 
access to records from Office of Independent 
Counsel Kenneth W. Starr 
Aug. 
10, 
2018 
Shannon Jarrett, 
Supervisory Archivist, 
G.W. Bush Library 
Sen. Richard 
Blumenthal 
Response to Aug. 8 FOIA request for 
Kavanaugh PRA records 
Aug. 
10, 
2018 
David Ferriero, Archivist Sen. Dianne Feinstein Response to Aug. 6 letter concerning 
interpretation of Section 2205 of the PRA 
Aug. 
16, 
2018 
Sen. Charles Grassley Gary M. Stern, NARA 
General Counsel 
First request to prioritize review of particular 
documents 
Aug. 
17, 
2018 
Gary M. Stern, NARA 
General Counsel 
Sen. Charles Grassely 
and Sen. Dianne 
Feinstein  
Second Response to Committee's request for 
access to records from Office of Independent 
Counsel Kenneth W. Star 
Aug. 
28, 
2018 
Sen. Charles Grassley Gary M. Stern, NARA 
General Counsel 
Second request to prioritize review of 
particular documents 
Aug. 
29, 
2018 
Gary M. Stern, NARA 
General Counsel 
 
Sen. Charles Grassley Response to July 27, 2018 request for records 
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Sept. 
12, 
2018 
Shannon Jarrett, 
Supervisory Archivist, 
G.W. Bush Library  
Sen. Richard 
Blumenthal 
Response to Aug. 8, 2018 FOIA request for 
Kavanaugh PRA records 
Sept. 
21, 
2018 
 
Gary M. Stern, NARA 
General Counsel 
 
 
Sen. Charles Grassely 
and Sen. Dianne 
Feinstein  
 
Third response to Committee's request for 
access to records from Office of Independent 
Counsel Kenneth W. Star 
Oct. 9, 
2018 
Sen. Charles Grassely Gary M. Stern, NARA 
General Counsel 
Withdrawal of July 27, 2018 request for 
records 
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